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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States, school districts are struggling to
educate their students in the face of drug problems, violence, and
deteriorated home situations that permeate the lives of large numbers
of today's teenagers.1 Many parents likewise face a daunting battle in
helping their children attain an education that will enable those
children to move beyond what their parents achieved financially.2
Additionally, recent economic downturns mean states have even less
1. See KAREN STABINER, ALL GIRLS: SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION AND WHY IT MATTERS 44
(2002) (citing the real problems in one inner city neighborhood facing the students, including
"overcrowded classes, battle-weary teachers, and the vocabulary of the streets: drugs, gang
fights, weapons, teenage pregnancy").
2. Id. Stabiner cites a mother of a girl at an inner city all-girls public school as believing
that the discrimination she experienced was economic; that because they were poor, her children
never got an even break. Id. Without a "decent" education, her daughters would stay poor; with
it, they had the chance to break the cycle. Id.
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money to spend on education, forcing the quality of education in some
already inadequate schools to fall further. 3 Meanwhile, studies show
that American children have fallen behind many of their foreign
counterparts in academic evaluations.
In light of these issues, many parents and schools are exploring
alternative methods of educating students. Perhaps the best-known
initiative is the school voucher movement in Cleveland, which the
Supreme Court recently upheld.4 Charter schools, too, are becoming
more popular with parents dissatisfied with their children's public
school educations. 5 Additionally, parents are becoming more likely to
teach their children at home. 6 Legislators and others interested in
traditional public schools cite smaller class sizes and higher teacher
salaries as ways of promoting achievement. 7
One recently revived possibility for improving secondary
education is the creation of single-sex classes and schools.8 Proponents
3. See Press Release, National Education Association, Corporate Tax Handouts Harm
Public Schools, NEA Report Shows (Jan. 22, 2003) (noting that "policymakers in many states are
searching for ways to deal with the worst budget crisis since World War II while providing public
schools with the funding they need to insure that all children receive a quality education"),
http://www.nea.org/nr/nr030122.html.
4. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Cleveland's program was based on
an Ohio law that provided for "assistance to families in any Ohio school district that is or has
been 'under federal court order requiring supervision and operational management of the district
by the state superintendent."' Id. at 644-45 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.975(A)
(Anderson 1999 & Supp. 2000)). The assistance could be in the form of tuition aid to attend a
participating public or private school, or in the form of tutorial aid if the student remained in his
or her present public school. Id. at 645.
5. Vaishali Honawar, Ehrlich Bill Would Open Way for More Charter Schools, WASH.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at B01 (noting that charter schools attract many students in failing school
systems, and that 2,400 charter schools have opened in the United States since 1992); see also
US Charter Schools, Overview (noting that Charter school enrollment increased 40 percent
between 1999 and 2003), http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscsdocs/o/index.htm (last visited
June 2, 2004). Charter schools have been described as "nonsectarian public schools of choice that
operate with freedom from many of the regulations that apply to traditional public schools. The
'charter' establishing each such school is a performance contract detailing the school's mission,
program, goals, students served, methods of assessment, and ways to measure success." US
Charter Schools, supra.
6. See Nat'l Home Educ. Research Inst., Fact Sheet 1ITb (noting that the number of
children being educated at home increases at a rate of 7 percent to 15 percent a year), at
http://www.nheri.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=19 (last visited May 10,
2004).
7. See, e.g., Rep. Ben Lujan, Commentary: Solons Share Governor's Aims for State, THE
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 22, 2003, at A-7 (listing as educational priorities for New Mexico
House Democrats: "Smaller class sizes. Mentoring for beginning teachers. Continued support for
full-day kindergarten. Develop reform for improving high-school graduation rates. Adequate
teacher salaries with advanced training and certification for teachers. Criteria-referenced testing
that shows how well children learn and accountability in the way teachers teach.").
8. See Karen Uhlenhuth, Single Sex, Singular Education?, KAN. CITY STAR, Dec. 17, 2002
(noting that the idea of single-sex education, while not a new idea, is "experiencing a resurgence
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argue that single-sex education decreases classroom discrimination,
improves educational experiences for both boys and girls, and gives
parents more choices from which to select the system of education that
works best for their children.9 Proponents also believe that separating
students by sex could increase the options available to poor and
minority children, whose parents may not otherwise be able to afford
the single-sex education traditionally offered only in private schools.10
Opponents contend that single-sex education presents the same
legal issue as did Brown v. Board of Education: state-endorsed
segregation of students. Segregation by gender, in opponents' eyes,
threatens to erase the gains women have made over the past
century. 12 Opponents fear that men who have attended a single-sex
of sorts," with increases in the single-sex schools, both public and private); Nat'l Ass'n for Single
Sex Pub. Educ., Single-sex Public Schools in the United States (noting that "[t]en years ago, only
three public schools in the United States offered single-sex educational opportunities. Right now
(spring 2004), there are at least 97 public schools in the United States offering some form of
single-sex public education."), at http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html (last visited June
2, 2004).
9. See CORNELIUS RIORDAN, GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL: TOGETHER OR SEPARATE? xii, 8,
10 (1990). Riordan noted that "all-girls schools consistently have provided a more effective
educational environment for girls than have mixed-sex schools," that studies indicate that
females do better academically in single-sex schools across a variety of cultures, and that
scholars have argued that there is a "chilly classroom climate" in American coeducational
colleges which "puts women students at a significant disadvantage," while "students at women's
colleges report higher self-confidence, greater involvement in both classroom and extracurricular
activities, greater satisfaction with their college experiences, and higher occupational
expectations." Id.; see also STABINER, supra note 1, at 3. Stabiner notes that most families do not
get the luxury of choosing whether their girls will achieve the most at a single-sex school, as
"they have to work with their neighborhood public school or find a way around it." Id. While
some studies indicate girls from poor minority communities are most helped by a single-sex
environment, their parents generally do not have that choice. Id.; see also Kay Bailey Hutchison,
The Lesson of Single-Sex Public Education: Both Successful and Constitutional, 50 AM. U. L.
REV. 1075, 1076 (2001) (arguing that "To save our public schools, we must be more creative and
expand the options for such schools-to give parents more choices to fit the needs of each child.").
10. See STABINER, supra note 1, at 44-45. Stabiner quotes one of the mothers of a girl at a
New York inner city, all-girls public school as asking in response to the legal challenges from the
New York Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Rights Coalition, as well as the National
Organization for Women, "Why shouldn't my girl have what the rich girls have?" Id.
11. But see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women's "Full Citizenship" A
Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 764 (2002) (noting that
the Court "has explicitly avoided making any judgments about the constitutionality of sex-
segregated public education under conditions of material parity, strongly suggesting that it
believes that this form of sex-based state action presents a difficult constitutional question").
12. See RIORDAN, supra note 9, at xi (noting the argument that "single-sex education is an
overly risky step backwards ... a step in reverse"); see also NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
WOMEN, COMMENTS OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO REGULATE ON SINGLE-SEX EDUCATION [hereinafter NOW
COMMENTS], http://www.now.org/issues/education/single-sex-education-comments.html (last
visited May 10, 2004). NOW argues that "OCR's proposal to introduce sex segregation into the
public schools contradicts the bedrock principles articulated in Brown." Id.
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school, and thereby have lacked contact with talented women, will be
unable to recognize such women as equals. Likewise, girls in a single-
sex environment and girls dealing with boys from a single-sex
environment may find themselves limited to stereotypical gender
roles. 13
Before states and school districts can begin to address the
social desirability of single-sex education, the legality and
constitutional legitimacy of such programs must be resolved. Current
Title IX regulations place limits on the ability of schools to restrict
student access to classes on the basis of sex.14 Any state-sponsored sex
discrimination also raises Equal Protection questions under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 15 While single-sex schools are permissible
under the current regulations interpreting Title IX, school districts
nervous about expensive lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of
the schools often avoid them. 16
While the constitutionality of single-sex programs has been
addressed by multiple commentators, several important issues have
been neglected. Single-sex schools have received the bulk of the
scholarly attention. Single-sex classes are either lumped under the
heading of single-sex education or not addressed at all.17 This Note
details the strengths of single-sex classes. It then goes a step beyond
establishing that single-sex programs in secondary schools can be
constitutional to recommending steps that local governments and
districts should take to comply with the mandates established by the
13. STABINER, supra note 1, at 314 (noting the argument of critics that single-sex education
could "nudge children back into limiting stereotypes"); see also NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12
(arguing that "[d]epriving boys and girls of the opportunity to interact daily as peers in the
classroom during their formative years will adversely affect gender relations in the adult
workplace and in their lives.... [C]ollaborative interaction between girls and boys in primary
and secondary schools should be fostered, not eliminated.").
14. 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.15(c)-(d), .34 (2003).
15. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (applying equal protection analysis to
the context of single-sex education); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
16. School districts are seemingly more comfortable now that the Department of Education
has officially announced that single-sex schools are consistent with Title IX. See Office for Civil
Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg.
31,102, 31,102 (May 8, 2002). Single-sex classes, however, are still proscribed under the
regulations. Id. Under the proposed regulations, single-sex classes would be permitted in limited
circumstances. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v.
Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 381; Kimberly M. Schuld, Rethinking Educational Equity: Sometimes, Different Can Be an
Acceptable Substitute for Equal, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461; Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex
Education: Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (2002);
Note, Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination?, 105
HARv. L. REV. 1741 (1992).
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Supreme Court in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan and
United States v. Virginia.
The remainder of this Note will proceed as follows. Part II
describes the legislative and regulatory position of single-sex
education. While single=sex classes are currently illegal, proposed
regulations currently under consideration or other legislative or
regulatory changes will likely allow more flexibility for implementing
single-sex education in coming years. Part III examines constitutional
limits on the ability of Congress and the Department of Education to
institute policies regarding single-sex education. Part III also
discusses the standard of review employed by the Court in United
States v. Virginia and concludes that classifications based on sex
continue to be subject to the intermediate scrutiny standard, which
requires the classifications to be substantially related to an important
state interest. Part IV applies this standard and concludes that
single-sex education is permissible because it is substantially related
to promoting the important government interests of preventing
discrimination, improving educational opportunities, and offering
diverse educational opportunities to students and their parents.
Finally, Part V addresses ways in which states and school districts can
best ensure the constitutionality of their programs. This Part
concludes that single-sex programs can more easily satisfy the
constitutional test when they consist of single-sex classes rather than
single-sex schools, and when they are in primary or secondary schools
rather than in higher education. Part V also suggests that districts
should offer single-sex classes to both boys and girls, rather than to
only one sex, and recommends that participation be voluntary rather
than mandatory.
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. Title IXRegulations
The primary statutory backdrop against which single-sex
education must be evaluated is Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in federally
funded programs.18 The Supreme Court has recognized that the
statute was enacted both to "avoid the use of federal resources to
support discriminatory practices" and "to provide individual citizens
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000). The statute provides that no one can "be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" on the basis of sex. Id.
634 [Vol. 57:2:629
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with effective protection against those practices."'19 The current
regulations regarding single-sex schools and classrooms in secondary
and elementary schools stem from Title IX.20 Although regulations
have been proposed, they have not yet been adopted and the current
regulatory framework remains the old rules.21
The regulations under Title IX generally prohibit classes or
educational programs open to only one sex. 22  However, some
exceptions exist to this broad limitation. Separation by ability, even if
the ability roughly correlates to sex, is acceptable in physical
education classes.23 Separation of students by sex within physical
education classes is also permitted when the class is participating in a
sport which has, either as its purpose or characteristic, a large amount
of bodily contact. 24 Additionally, portions of classes in elementary and
secondary schools that concern the treatment of human sexuality can
be separated by sex, and choral groups may segregate based on vocal
range or quality requirements which have the effect of limiting a
chorus to one sex. 25 Finally, separation of students by sex is allowed
under the regulations if it constitutes remedial or affirmative action. 26
These exceptions are fairly narrow. Thus, most classes cannot be
offered as single-sex opportunities.
The regulations treat single-sex schools differently than single-
sex classrooms. Title IX applies to admissions only for institutes of
vocational education, professional education, graduate higher
education, and public institutions of undergraduate higher
education. 27  The regulations interpreting Title IX were drafted
accordingly and do not apply to the admissions policies of elementary
and secondary schools. School districts can limit the enrollment of
such schools to members of one sex as long as they offer to each
person, "pursuant to the same policies and criteria of admission,
courses, services, and facilities comparable to each course, service, and
19. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998).
20. Office for Civil Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines on Title IX
Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,102.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2003) (stating that "a recipient shall not provide any course or
otherwise carry out any of its education program or activity separately on the basis of sex, or
require or refuse participation therein by any of its students on such basis, including health,
physical education, industrial, business, vocational, technical, home economics, music, and adult
education courses").
23. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b); see also Office for Civil Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools:
Guidelines on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102.
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(c).
25. § 106.34(e)-(f).
26. § 106.3(a)-(b).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
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facility offered in or through such schools. '28  The longstanding
interpretation of the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights
(Office of Civil Rights), the office within the Department of Education
responsible for ensuring equal access to education, has been that the
comparable educational opportunity for the other sex also has to be
provided in a single-sex school. 29
Due to the limited legality of single-sex classrooms, the only
way for a secondary school system to successfully comply with the
current Title IX regulations and still provide interested students the
opportunity to learn in a single-sex environment is to construct
entirely separate schools. 30  Brighter Choice Charter Schools in
Albany, New York, for example, has established, within one school
building, two "separate" schools that operate as different legal entities
with separate bank accounts. 31 Although the students effectively
attend the same school with the same teachers, the requirements of
the regulations have forced the fiction of two separate schools in order
to offer single-sex classes.32  As this example illustrates, school
systems face significant regulatory barriers to establishing single-sex
education, particularly when those systems wish to offer single-sex
classes.
B. No Child Left Behind Act
In January 2002, Congress passed the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 ("Act"), a collection of extensive amendments to the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 33  These
amendments were collectively called the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001. The express purpose of the Act, proposed by President George
W. Bush, was to ensure that "all children have a fair, equal, and
significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach,
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging State academic achievement
28. § 106.35(b).
29. Office for Civil Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines on Title IX
Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102, 31,103 (May 8, 2002); see also Office for Civil Rights,
Overview of the Agency, http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html (last visited June 2,
2004).
30. Id. at 31,102 (noting that the current Title IX regulations prohibit single-sex classes and
activities, but that the Title IX statute exempts the admissions practices of non-vocational
elementary and secondary schools).
31. Michelle Davis, Department Aims to Promote Single-Sex Schools, EDUC. WK., May 15,
2002, at 24, 24.
32. Id.
33. See Pub. L. No. 107-110 (2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7916).
[Vol. 57:2:629
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standards and state academic assessments. '34 President Bush's four
basic reform principles are reflected in the Act: more accountability for
results, increased flexibility and control for local school boards, greater
options for parents, and a focus on using scientifically proven teaching
methods. 35 Part of the increased control given to state governments
and school districts includes more flexibility regarding how to spend
federal education dollars. 36
A brief but highly important amendment to the No Child Left
Behind Act allows federal funds to be used for innovative programs,
including "[p]rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms
(consistent with applicable law)."3 7 Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, a
Republican from Texas, cosponsored the amendment with Senator
Susan Collins, a Republican from Maine, and with Democratic
Senators Hillary Clinton of New York and Barbara Mikulski of
Maryland. Their stated purpose in passing the amendment was to
facilitate education reform programs through same-sex schools and
classrooms, as long as comparable educational opportunities are
offered to both sexes.38 The amendment also directed the Department
of Education to issue guidelines on current regulations within 120
days of passing the Act so as to guide local schools in implementing
such programs while being "consistent with applicable law. '39
Senator Hutchison, a long-time advocate of single-sex schools,
said the amendment was merely intended to make it easier for a
school system or local government to provide the option of single-sex
schools where requested by parents. 40 Senator Hutchison has argued
that saving public schools requires that society "be more creative and
expand the options for such schools-to give parents more choices to
fit the needs of each child."41 Senator Hutchison's amendment was
approved by a unanimous vote in the Senate. 42
34. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
35. Dep't of Educ., No Child Left Behind, at http://www.ed.gov/nclbflanding.jhtml; see also §
6301 (summarizing the means of achieving the desired end of high-quality education, including
providing "greater decisionmaking authority and flexibility to schools and teachers in return for
greater responsibility for student performance").
36. 147 CONG. REC. S13366 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bunning).
37. § 7215(a)(23).
38. 147 CONG. REC. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
39. § 7215(c). At present, the primary legal constraints on single-sex programs are Title IX
and the Fourteenth Amendment.
40. 147 CONG. REC. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hutchison).
41. Hutchison, supra note 9, at 1076.
42. Press Release, Senate Passes Education Bill, Senator Hutchison's Single-Sex Education
Amendment Included, http://hutchison.senate.gov/pr1334.htm (June 14, 2001).
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C. Proposed Title IX Regulations To Provide More Flexibility to Local
and State Governments
On May 8, 2002, the Office for Civil Rights issued two
important releases. The first, in response to the congressional
mandate in Senator Hutchison's amendment, summarized the current
legal constraints on the ability of public elementary and secondary
schools to offer single-sex schools and classrooms.43 The second, and
ultimately more important, offered public notice of the intent of the
Office for Civil Rights to amend the regulations interpreting Title IX
to allow local governments and school boards greater flexibility to
implement single sex schools. 44 The release noted that single-sex
classes and schools could be "important and legitimate efforts to
improve educational outcomes for all students."45 According to the
Office for Civil Rights, this increased flexibility was not based on the
idea that the sexes need to be educated differently because of the
limitations of one sex, but instead was based on the belief that all
children could benefit from having the option of single-sex education.4 6
The Office for Civil Rights therefore declared its intent to
permit "appropriate latitude" for schools to use "innovative efforts to
help children learn and to expand the choices parents have for their
children's education consistent with Title IX and the Constitution."47
The Office for Civil Rights recognized that one purpose of the No Child
Left Behind Act was to give parents the opportunity to choose a
program that best fit their children's needs through enabling
educators to provide a wider variety of options. 48 So long as the
regulations were consistent with Title IX's goal of equal opportunities
for both sexes, the Office for Civil Rights believed that more freedom
with regard to single-sex education would be consistent with the
requirements of Title IX and would effectuate the purposes of the No
Child Left Behind Act. 49
On March 9, 2004, the Office for Civil Rights released proposed
regulations for Title IX. Noting that "educational research has
suggested that in certain circumstances, single-sex education provides
43. Office for Civil Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines on Title IX
Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102, 31,102 (May 8, 2002).
44. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (May 8, 2002); see also Title IX, §§ 1681.1688.
45. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
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educational benefits for some students," the Office concluded that
additional flexibility for single-sex educational options is appropriate,
so long as appropriate safeguards exist. 50 The Office for Civil Rights
proposed changing the strict limitations on the provision of single-sex
classes in the context of secondary schools, although coeducational
postsecondary schools would remain limited to the narrow areas of
single-sex classes allowed by the current regulations.5 1 The proposed
regulations would allow nonvocational single-sex classes as long as the
following requirements were met: (1) Each single sex class must be
based either on the objective of providing a diversity of educational
options to parents and students, or on the objective of meeting the
particular, identified educational needs of its students; (2) the district
must offer a substantially equal coeducational class in the same
subject; and (3) the objective must be implemented in an evenhanded
manner. 52 If these regulations are adopted, single-sex classes will
become a much more realistic possibility for school districts.
D. The Statutory and Regulatory Future of Single-Sex Classes and
Schools
Perhaps because single-sex classrooms are illegal under the
current Title IX regulations, most of the academic debate has revolved
around the permissibility of single-sex schools. Single-sex schools are
not subject to the same regulatory bar and thus present immediate
possibilities for school districts if constitutional standards are met.53
Additionally, while local residents not attending a single-sex private
school are likely to be aware that it admits only boys or only girls, they
are probably unaware of the internal gender divisions between classes
in a coeducational school. Because single-sex schools are more visible,
they may inspire more popular and academic debate than do single-
sex classrooms. Because single-sex classes are currently illegal, local
governments and school districts seeking to experiment focus on
single-sex schools.
50. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance; Proposed Rules, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,275, 11,276-77 (proposed March 9,
2004) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106) [hereinafter Proposed Regulations].
51. Id. at 11278 (Proposed 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)). Vocational schools, which are, under Title
IX, subject to the Title IX admissions requirements, would also continue to be prohibited from
offering single-sex classes. Id.
52. Id. at 11284-85 (proposed 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(1). The regulations further note that a
recipient providing a single-sex class may be required to provide a substantially equal single-sex
class for the other sex, and describes factors that will be considered in determining substantial
equality. Id. (Proposed 34 C.F.R. § 106.34(b)(2)-(3)).
53. See sources cited supra note 17.
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Even before the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act,
Rosemary Salomone predicted that the Title IX regulations might
have to be reinterpreted or rewritten in light of the decision by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia. The newly energized
school choice movement and the increased desire of families,
particularly in the inner city, to shape their children's education
would also push the agency and Congress to action. 54 Salomone
argues that a reinterpretation of the regulations that allowed more
flexibility in single-sex education would be consistent with Title IX, as
Congress never intended a total ban on single-sex education.55
Senator Hutchison's amendment only made this reinterpretation more
likely, as the amendment's sponsors intended to remove regulatory
barriers to single-sex education. 56 Removal of these barriers would
allow public schools to institute single-sex classrooms as long as the
schools did not step back from the goals of equal opportunity
embedded in Title IX or violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause. 57 Senator Hutchison has noted that an earlier,
temporary amendment she proposed, similar to that enacted in the No
Child Left Behind Act, "sent the unmistakable signal that single-sex
public school programs are legal and acceptable."58
The Proposed Regulations are consistent with the ideas of more
flexibility supported by Professor Salomone and Senator Hutchison.
Even if these proposed changes are not adopted, public support could
still push Congress to change Title IX or its interpretation. In
response to the No Child Left Behind Act, about six single-sex, public
secondary schools opened in Fall 2002 and eight more in Fall 2003.59
This response indicates that parents and educators desire to have
such schools and that they perceive the actions of Congress and the
54. Rosemary Salomone, Education and the Constitution: Shaping Each Other in the Next
Century: Rich Kids, Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 AKRON L. REV. 209, 210,
222 (2000); see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
55. Salomone, supra note 54, at 225.
56. 20 U.S.C. § 7215(a)(23) (2000); see also 147 CONG. REC. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001)
(statement of Sen. Hutchison). Senator Hutchison stated that the amendment intended to
remove barriers and red tape associated with opening a public school to only one sex, and to
make it easier for a school system or local government to provide the option of single sex schools
if parents requested such schools. Id.
57. 147 CONG. REC. S5943 (daily ed. June 7, 2001) (statement of Sen. Clinton) (describing
the work of herself and the other senators as attempting to find a compromise that would
"further the ability of our school districts around the country to develop and implement quality
single-sex educational opportunities as a part of providing a diversity of public school choices to
students and parents but ... doing it in a way that in no way undermines title IX or the equal
protection clause of the Constitution").
58. Hutchison, supra note 9, at 1081.
59. Nat'l Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., supra note 8.
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Department of Education as clearing the way.60 Thus, even if the
Department does not ultimately legalize single-sex classes, Congress
should, and very well may, legislate to do so. The legal bar to single-
sex classes would then disappear, leaving only the constitutional
concerns to be considered.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE ACTIONS OF THE OFFICE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE CONGRESS
Neither the congressional legislation nor the regulations of the
Office for Civil Rights are written on a blank slate.61 In two major
cases, the Supreme Court has struck down particular single-sex
postsecondary schools as unconstitutional violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.62  Therefore, any
regulations that increase the flexibility of local boards to offer single-
sex schools will likely raise equal protection questions.63.
The Supreme Court's first involvement with single-sex
education came in Vorchheimer v. School District of Philadelphia.64 In
that case, the Court affirmed without opinion the Third Circuit's
decision to uphold the constitutionality of Philadelphia's single-sex
high schools. 65 The Court first provided an extensive analysis of the
constitutional questions raised by single-sex education in the 1982
case Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (MU). 66 The Court
examined the constitutionality of the all-female nature of Mississippi
University for Women's (MUW) nursing school and ultimately found
that maintenance of the school violated the Equal Protection Clause.67
60. Melanie Markley, Back to School: Where the Boys Are: Not a Girl in Sight as New
Charter School Opens Its Doors in Houston, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 20, 2002, at A13.
61. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 50, at 11277 n.4 (noting that the OCR had
considered Supreme Court decisions including United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996),
and Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), in developing the proposed
new regulations).
62. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 515; Miss. Univ. Women, 458 U.S. at 718. Beyond the
constitutional question, the regulations could also be struck down if they were contrary to an
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress or were an impermissible construction of a statute
that was ambiguous or silent as to the question at hand. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, this possibility is beyond the scope of this Note.
63. See, e.g., NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12. NOW argues that OCR's proposal is contrary
to the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), and
that it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12.
64. 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
65. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided court,
430 U.S. 703 (1977).
66. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
67. Id. at 731.
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The Court's second major single-sex education case was United States
v. Virginia.68 In Virginia, the Court considered the all-male Virginia
Military Institute (VMI), along with its parallel institution, the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL).69 The Court found
that VMI was a unique educational experience and that VWIL was
substantially inferior to VMI.v0 Thus, the Court concluded that the
maintenance of VMI as an all-male school was unconstitutional. 71
A. Vorchheimer: Setting the Stage
In Vorchheimer, the Third Circuit considered Philadelphia's
maintenance of two academic high schools, one of which was all-male
and one of which was all-female.7 2 The plaintiff, a female student, did
not like Girls High, the all-female academic school, and wished to
enroll instead in Central High School, the all-male academic school.
The plaintiff complained that her comprehensive school did not set
high enough standards for its students.7 3 The district court found that
the two schools were "academically and functionally equivalent," but
nonetheless concluded that there was not a "fair and substantial
relationship" between the gender-based classification and the state's
legitimate interest.74 Therefore, it concluded that the division of the
sexes in these schools was unconstitutional. 75
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, finding no evidence that
Congress had intended to require all public schools to be
coeducational. 76 The court took the finding of equivalency to establish
that the plaintiff wanted to enroll at Central High due to a personal
68. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 519.
71. Id.
72. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1976). The court described the
Philadelphia School District as having four types of senior high schools: academic,
comprehensive, technical, and magnet. Id. The comprehensive schools had a wide range of
courses, including college preparatory classes, and advanced placement classes available. Id.
There were three single.sex comprehensive schools; two were all male and one was all female. Id.
Academic high schools had high admission standards and offered only college preparatory
courses. Id. Philadelphia had two academic high schools; one was all male and one was all
female. Id. Plaintiff at the time of the suit was enrolled in a coeducational comprehensive school
and desired admission to the all-male academic school. Id.
73. Id. at 882.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 885. The court cited the legislative history of the Equal Educational Opportunity
Act of 1974 and concluded that the inconsistent inclusion and exclusion of sex as a category
meant that the legislation was ambiguous towards the existence of single-sex schools. Id. at 884.
The legislature's primary focus in debate and intent was the issue of busing. Id.
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preference rather than an objectively better educational opportunity. 77
Thus, the plaintiff had not alleged that she was receiving an unequal
education and there was no discrimination. If there were detriments
to the single-sex construction of the academic schools, they affected
both boys and girls equally.78
While committed to the concept that "there is no fundamental
difference between races and therefore, in justice, there can be no
dissimilar treatment," the court concluded that "there are differences
between the sexes which may, in limited circumstances, justify
disparity in law." 79 A legitimate educational policy could be served
through single-sex high schools, and therefore "[m]easures which
would allow innovation in methods and techniques to achieve that
goal have a high degree of relevance."80  While the effectiveness of
single-sex schools in serving an educational policy was not universally
accepted, the idea was respected.81 The Third Circuit declined to rule
on the issue of whether a rational relationship or substantial
relationship test was appropriate for this sort of gender-based
classification, since utilizing single-sex high schools would satisfy
either test.8 2 To find such schools unconstitutional would "stifle the
ability of the local school board to continue with a respected
educational methodology" and deny freedom of choice to parents and
students desiring a public, single-sex school.8 3 In a 4-4 decision, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit without
giving guidance as to the appropriate reasoning or test to apply.8 4
B. Mississippi University for Women
In Mississippi University for Women, the Supreme Court first
presented extensive reasoning on the constitutionality of a school's
exclusion of students on the basis of sex.8 5 Mississippi University for
Women was established in 1884 by the Mississippi Legislature as the
Mississippi Industrial Institute and College for the Education of White
Girls of the State of Mississippi.8 6 At the time of the decision, MUW
77. Id. at 882.
78. Id. at 886.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 887-88.
81. Id. at 888.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
85. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
86. Id. at 719-20.
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was the oldest state-supported all-female college in the country.8 7
Mississippi did not have any other single-sex public university or
college, so the court was not faced with the question, presented to the
Third Circuit in Vorchheimer,88 of whether a state could have
"separate but equal" schools for men and women.8 9 Instead, the
narrow question presented to the Court was whether a state-
supported professional nursing school that excluded males violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 90
The plaintiff in MUW was a male registered nurse who did not
hold a baccalaureate degree in nursing.91 He applied for admission to
the MUW School of Nursing but was refused admission because of his
sex.92 He was told that he could audit classes but could not enroll for
credit. 93 He subsequently filed an action in United States District
Court, claiming that the single-sex admissions policy violated the
Fourteenth Amendment. 94
In ruling in favor of the State, the District Court asked
whether the "maintenance of MUW as a single-sex school bears a
rational relationship to the State's legitimate interest" in providing
educational options to the female students in Mississippi. 95 Since
providing single-sex schools was consistent with a respected theory of
educational benefits, the admissions policy was not arbitrary. 96
The Fifth Circuit reversed and rejected the "rational
relationship" test in favor of a test stating that "gender-based
classifications must be substantially related to important
governmental objectives in order to withstand constitutional
challenge. '97 Although the State did have a significant interest in
providing educational opportunities to all its students, the Fifth
Circuit found that the State had failed to show that providing a
87. Id.
88. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
Vorchheimer is discussed in more depth supra Part III.A.
89. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 720 n. 1.
90. Id. at 719.
91. Id. at 720.
92. Id. at 720-21.
93. Id. at 721.




97. Hogan v. Miss. Univ. for Women, 646 F.2d 1116, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1981). Without
mentioning the term intermediate scrutiny, the court notes that sex discrimination gets a lower
level of scrutiny than does race discrimination, but gives the test quoted above as the proper test
instead of a rational relationship test. Id. at 1118.
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unique opportunity for females, but not for males, was substantially
related to that interest.98
The Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit, held that any policy expressly discriminating among
applicants on the basis of gender is subject to scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause, regardless of whether it discriminates
against males or females.9 9 The Court further held that any party
seeking to uphold a statute classifying people on the basis of gender
must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the
classification. 100 This burden can only be met by showing that "the
classification serves 'important government objectives"' and that the
State's means are "substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives." 101 The Court recognized that the statutory objective itself
must be free of "archaic and stereotypic notions." 10 2 If the objective is
to exclude or "protect" members of one gender due to a supposed
inherent handicap or innate inferiority, then the objective itself is
invalid. 103
The Court rejected the State's argument that the single-sex
policy served the important government interest of compensating for
past discrimination against women. 10 4 The Court recognized that a
gender-based classification could be justified if it "intentionally and
directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened."10 5 The Court would still perform the same searching
analysis of the classification in such a situation, however. Scrutiny of
the factual circumstances revealed that women did not lack
opportunities to obtain nursing training or reach leadership positions,
either when the School of Nursing was opened or when the case was
decided.106 In fact, women were overrepresented in the field of
nursing, receiving more than 94 percent of the baccalaureate nursing
degrees nationwide. 10 7 Therefore, MUW's policy of excluding males,
98. Id. at 1119.
99. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 723.
100. Id. at 724.
101. Id. (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). As in
Virginia, the two competing standards-"exceedingly persuasive justification" and "substantially
related to the achievement of [important government] objectives"-lead to some confusion. As the
latter, traditional formulation is clearer in application, with the former only being defined in
terms of the latter, this Note will generally use that test. See infra Part III.D.
102. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725.
103. Id. at 724-25.
104. Id. at 727.
105. Id. at 728.
106. Id. at 729.
107. Id. at 729 n.14.
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rather than helping women into a field that had been closed to them,
furthered the stereotypical view of nursing as a job for women.108
The Court also found that the all-female policy violated the
second prong of the announced test because there was no showing that
the gender-based classification was "substantially and directly
related" to the compensatory objective. 10 9 Because men were allowed
to audit classes, the State could not plausibly argue that it was
achieving the benefits of a school where women were not adversely
affected by the presence of men." 0 Since neither the interest nor the
relationship between the interest and the means satisfied the Court's
standards, the Court held that the all-female policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause."' The State fell short of proving an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for the maintenance of the school" 2 While
Mississippi defended its classification scheme on the grounds that
Congress had intended, through Title IX, to explicitly exclude from its
coverage colleges that had historically been all-female, the Court
found that Congress did not have the power to change the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3  To the extent that single-sex
education failed to fulfill the substantial relationship test necessary to
justify the gender-based classification, Congress could not legislatively
permit it. Similarly, if single-sex secondary schools or classes are
unconstitutional, the fact that Congress or an agency desires to
expressly permit them is irrelevant.
C. Virginia Military Institute
The Supreme Court's second consideration of the
constitutionality of single-sex schools came in response to a challenge
to the all-male Virginia Military Institute. 14 At the time of the case,
VMI, which was financially supported by the State of Virginia, was
the only single-sex school out of the fifteen public institutions of
108. Id. at 729 & n. 14.
109. Id. at 730.
110. Id. at 730-31.
111. Id. at 731
112. Id.
113. Id. at 732. The Court quotes Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966), as
holding that Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which allowed
Congress broad power to enforce the Amendment, was "limited to adopting measures to enforce
the guarantees of the Amendment; section 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or
dilute these guarantees." While Congress deserved deference in decisions and classifications,
Congress could not validate a law denying the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 732-33.
114. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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higher learning in Virginia.1 5 VMI attempted to prepare men for
leadership in both civilian and military life through a unique training
program with an "adversative method" modeled on English public
schools. 116  This method included "physical rigor, mental stress,
absolute equality of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation
of behavior, and indoctrination in desirable values.""17 Reflecting
VMI's high status, its alumni included military generals, members of
Congress, and business executives. The school's prestigious graduates
had created the largest per-student endowment of any public
undergraduate school in the United States."18
Upon a challenge from a female high school student who
wished to be admitted to VMI, the District Court followed Mississippi
University for Women and looked for an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for government action based on sex." 9 It described this
test as a consideration of whether "the classification serves important
governmental objectives and [whether] the discriminatory means
employed are substantially related to the achievement of those
objectives."' 20 The District Court found that some changes would have
to be made to the school's program if women were admitted, including
the addition of allowances for personal privacy and alterations of the
physical education requirements to accommodate the women. 12'
These changes constituted sufficient constitutional justification for a
single-sex program, as adding women to the unique educational
experience would fundamentally alter that experience. 122
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated this
judgment, finding that a "policy of diversity which aims to provide an
array of educational opportunities, including single-gender
institutions, must do more than favor one gender."' 23 The court thus
proposed three permissible courses of action: 1) admit women to VMI;
115. Id. at 520.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 522. The adversative method is further characterized by Spartan living
conditions with constant surveillance and no privacy; uniforms; all cadets eating together in the
mess hall; regular participation in drills; the "rat line," comparable to Marine boot camp, which
bonds cadets to their fellow sufferers; a hierarchical "class system" of privileges and
responsibilities; a senior class mentor assigned to each entering class "rat"; and a strict honor
code. Id.
118. Id. at 520.
119. Id. at 523-24.
120. Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
121. Id. at 524 (citing United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412-13 (W.D. Va.
1991)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 525 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
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2) establish parallel institutions or programs; or 3) terminate state
support and allow VMI to proceed as a private school.124
In response, Virginia elected to establish a parallel program for
women called the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership. 125 The
program would share VMI's mission of producing "citizen-soldiers,"
but it would have different academic offerings, methods of education,
and financial resources. 126. Virginia agreed to provide equal funding
for students at each of the schools, and the VMI Foundation offered to
give the VWIL program a $5.4625 million endowment. 127 The VMI
Alumni Association also agreed to give VWIL graduates access to a
network of employers interested in VMI graduates. 128
VWIL was designed to have methods of instruction that would
be appropriate for "most women."'1 29 The task force appointed from
among Mary Baldwin faculty and staff to design the program parallel
to VMI conceded that it would be easier both to develop a program at
VWIL that more closely paralleled the one at VMI and to defend such
a program in litigation. The task force decided, however, that such a
program would be "a paper program, with no real prospect of
successful implementation," since it would not be well-suited to the
different needs of female students. 130 Both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals approved the plan, with the Court of Appeals finding
that the adversative method used at VMI could not be used in a
coeducational environment. 131 The Court of Appeals held that the
124. Id. at 525-26.
125. Id. at 526. VWIL would be located at Mary Baldwin College, a private, all-female,
liberal arts school, and was initially to be open to twenty five to thirty female students. Id.
126. Id. The district court found that Mary Baldwin was ultimately inferior to VMI in
several ways. The average combined SAT score of entrants at Mary Baldwin was about one
hundred points lower than at VMI. Id. The faculty at Mary Baldwin had fewer Ph.D.s and lower
salaries. Id. While VMI had degrees in liberal arts, the sciences, and engineering, Mary Baldwin
offered only bachelor of arts degrees; students in the Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership
could get an engineering degree by attending Washington University in St. Louis, a private
school, at their own expense for two years. Id.
127. Id. at 527. VMI had a $131 million endowment, while Mary Baldwin's was $19 million.
Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 526-27 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994)).
VWIL would be different in several specific ways from VMI. While VWIL students would
participate in ROTC programs and a "largely ceremonial" Virginia Corps of Cadets, there would
not be a military format to the VWIL House, and there would be no requirement to eat meals
together or to wear uniforms to school. Id. at 527. The adversative method unique to VMI would
be replaced with a "cooperative method which reinforces self-esteem." Id. VWIL students would
take classes in leadership, do an off-campus leadership externship, participate in community
service projects, and assist in arranging a speaker series. Id.
130. United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1995).
131. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 528.
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appropriate test was whether the men at VMI and the women at
VWIL would receive "substantively comparable benefits at their
institution" and ultimately found the educational opportunities of the
two schools to be "sufficiently comparable."' 132
The Supreme Court approved the basic standard of review,
that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that
action."13 3 It further agreed that the State had to show important
governmental objectives and means that were substantially related to
achieving those objectives. 134  The justification could not rely on
"overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or
preferences of males and females.' 1 35  While supposed, inherent
differences are unacceptable justifications for classifying people on the
basis of race or national origin, physical differences between men and
women indicate that sex is not a completely proscribed
classification. 136 Classifications cannot be used, however, "to create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."'3 7
The Court specifically noted that, similar to Mississippi
University for Women, the case concerned an educational opportunity
that was unique and available only at VMI, and thus presented no
"separate but equal" question. 38  Upon examining the State's
proffered objective, pursuit of diversity in higher education, the Court
found that the "alleged objective" was not the actual purpose of the
classification. 139  Because all of the other public college and
universities in Virginia had become coeducational, it did not seem
realistic to believe that the State was truly aiming to offer diversity. 40
The State's second major argument was that VMI's unique
method could not be made available without alterations to
accommodate women.14' The lower court had made findings of fact
132. Id. at 529.
133. Id. at 531.
134. Id. at 533.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 534.
138. Id. at 536 n.7; cf. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720 n.1 (1982)
(recognizing that unlike Vorchheimer, this case did not present a question of "separate but
equal").
139. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536; cf. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 730 (finding that the
alleged objective, compensating for former discrimination against women, did not match the
actual purpose behind the discriminatory classification since there was not actually
discrimination against women in the field of nursing).
140. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539.
141. Id. at 540.
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concerning the differences between male and female "tendencies."'142
While these findings were not challenged, the Court noted that it had
repeatedly told courts to take a "hard look" at generalizations or
"tendencies" such as those suggested here. 143 State actors could not
constitutionally exclude some individuals from opportunities based on
"fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females."144  Regardless of the proportion of women who wanted to
attend VMI, the Court said, it still had to consider whether Virginia
could "constitutionally deny to women who have the will and capacity,
the training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely
affords."' 45  The Court cited several examples where people had
assumed women were unqualified for fields in which they later
excelled. 46 In questioning whether the admission of women would
actually diminish VMI's reputation and destroy the adversative
system, the Court held that this fear was not an "exceedingly
persuasive" justification. 47  The great goal of Virginia, to create
citizen-soldiers, was not, in the Court's view, a goal that was
substantially advanced by the categorical exclusion of women. 148
The Court further rejected the proposed parallel institute, the
VWIL, finding it to be inferior to VMI in "tangible and intangible
facilities."'149 VMI's famous adversative method would be denied to
women because the VWIL intended to utilize a "cooperative method"
that would reinforce self-esteem. 150 While the task force that designed
the VWIL determined that the method used at VMI would be
inappropriate for most women, there was no assertion that it was
appropriate even for most men.' 5' Citing various other differences,
the Court held that VWIL could not be considered a "comparable
single-gender women's institution," but was a "pale shadow" of VMI. 52
As in Sweatt v. Painter, where the Court rejected separate law schools
142. Id. at 541. These differences included such beliefs as "males tend to need an atmosphere
of adversativeness," while "females tend to thrive in a cooperative atmosphere." Id. The experts
testified that while there were certainly exceptions to these generalizations, educational
experiences had to be designed around the rule, rather than the exception. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725).
145. Id. at 542.
146. Id. at 543-45.
147. Id. (citing examples of past gender discrimination including the move to exclude women
from the practice of law, the practice of medicine, and the field of police work).
148. Id. at 545-46.
149. Id. at 547.
150. Id. at 548.
151. Id. at 550.
152. Id. at 551-553 (citing United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995)
(Phillips, J., dissenting)). For a list of the noted differences, see supra notes 126-127.
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for black and white students, the most important differences in the
allegedly parallel programs were in the "reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the alumni,
standing in the community, traditions and prestige."153 In the context
of VMI and VWIL, the Court saw no substantial equality in any of
these areas.
In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for the lack of
clarity in the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" and for
what he viewed as a virtual abandonment of the traditional language
of intermediate scrutiny, which required only that a gender
classification be "substantially related to an important government
objective." 154 In light of the constitutional principles announced by the
majority, Justice Scalia argued that
regardless of whether the Court's rationale leaves some small amount of room for
lawyers to argue, it ensures that single-sex public education is functionally dead. The
costs of litigating the constitutionality of a single-sex education program, and the risks
of ultimately losing that litigation, are simply too high to be embraced by public
officials... . No state official in his right mind will buy such a high-cost, high-risk
lawsuit by commencing a single-sex program. The enemies of single-sex education have
won; by persuading only seven Justices (five would have been enough) that their view of
the world is enshrined in the Constitution, they have effectively imposed that view on
all 50 States.
15 5
Some opponents of single-sex education cite Justice Scalia's dissent as
proof that the Virginia decision completely precludes such schools.1 56
However, other commentators believe that he overstated the Court's
holding and that a case less extreme than Virginia, in which Virginia
limited perhaps the most traditionally male field to only men, would
result in a different conclusion. 157 Justice Scalia himself noted that
153. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554; see also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
154. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 596-97.
156. See NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12 (arguing that the proposal to establish single-sex
schools or classes in public primary and secondary schools is unconstitutional in part because
"[a]s Justice Scalia acknowledged, such an effort cannot survive equal protection scrutiny").
157. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75
(1996) (arguing that "it would be incorrect to conclude, as Justice Scalia does in his dissent, that
the Court has by its rationale committed future courts to invalidation of all educational
programs, public and private, that separate the sexes"); see also William Henry Hurd, Gone with
the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POLY 27, 44 (1997) (arguing that "[w]hile many of Justice Scalia's blows on the majority are well
deserved, this one hits too hard. The Court made no such sweeping pronouncement, nor does its
opinion necessarily imply such a result. On the contrary, the majority went out of its way to
emphasize that its decision turned on the unique nature of VMI, and that no per se
condemnation of single-sex public education was implied."); Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching
for the Silver Lining: Constructing a Nonremedial yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for
Single-Sex Educational Programs in Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 374 (2001) (noting
the argument of many scholars that VMI only invalidated that particular program, and arguing
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the Court may still decide not to apply the VMI principles to future
cases, including those cases involving challenges to the provision of
federal funds to private single-sex schools.'58 Rather, he hoped that
the Court would narrowly read Virginia as applying to a "uniquely
prestigious all-male institution, conceived in chauvinism."'159 Justice
Ginsburg, author of the Virginia majority opinion, lends support to
this prediction in a later speech, noting that
the VMI case was not really about the military. Nor did the Court question the value or
viability of single-sex schools. Instead, VMI was about a State that invested heavily in a
college designed to produce business and civic leaders, that for generations succeeded
admirably in the endeavor, and that strictly limited this unparalleled opportunity to
man.
1 60
The ultimate reach of the Virginia rationale is therefore unclear.
D. Scrutiny of Sex-Based Classifications after Mississippi University
for Women and Virginia
The MUW and Virginia majorities both use the phrase
"exceedingly persuasive justification" to describe the test for upholding
a gender classification. 61 In Virginia, the majority opinion refers to
applying "skeptical scrutiny" when a court examines government
classifications based on sex. 162 Each case explains the test by noting
that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."'163 However, Justice Scalia's dissent in Virginia cites the
phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification" to argue that, regardless
of what the Court said, the majority had effectively heightened the
standard of review beyond the intermediate scrutiny standard. 64
in their support that "it should be noted that Virginia never implies there are no acceptable
justifications for gender classifications"); Linda L. Peter, Note, What Remains of Public Choice
and Parental Rights: Does the V'I Decision Preclude Exclusive Schools or Classes Based on
Gender?, 33 CAL. W. L. REv. 249, 251 (1997) (concluding that "Justice Scalia's concern over the
end of single-gender education is unfounded").
158. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Id.
160. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for the Celebration of 75 Years of Women's Enrollment
at Columbia Law School October 19, 2002, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1447 (2002).
161. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
162. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
163. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see Virginia, 518 U.S. at 523-24; Miss. Univ.
for Women, 458 U.S. at 724.
164. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (holding that "a party seeking to uphold government action
based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification", and
further explaining that "[t]o succeed, the defender of the challenged action must show 'at least
that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory
means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives' "); id. at 570-71
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Commentators disagree as to whether the Court, in changing its
terminology, raised the standard that the state must meet to justify a
gender classification. 165
For several reasons, this Note will continue to apply the
intermediate scrutiny standard, rather than a higher, "exceedingly
persuasive justification" standard, when evaluating the
constitutionality of gender-based classifications. First, the Supreme
Court has unanimously adopted an intermediate scrutiny standard for
discriminatory classifications based on sex. 166 In the context of single-
sex education, the Court continues to define its approach by reference
to the intermediate scrutiny standard, which requires that the
challenged gender classification be substantially related to achieving
important governmental objectives. 167 While commentators have been
somewhat justified in asserting that the Court, in the Virginia
opinion, uses language that implies that the standard for justifying
classifications based on sex has been raised above intermediate
scrutiny, 168 unanimously accepted precedent presumably remains
unchanged until explicitly disavowed. Second, the Court, in Virginia,
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority fails to apply the appropriate test, because "we
evaluate a statutory classification based on sex under a standard that lies 'between the extremes
of rational basis review and strict scrutiny.' We have denominated this standard 'intermediate
scrutiny' and under it have inquired whether the statutory classification is 'substantially related
to an important governmental objective.' ")
165. Compare Christopher H. Pyle, Women's Colleges: Is Segregation by Sex Still Justifiable
After United States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REV. 209, 233 (1997) (arguing that "Justice
Ginsburg's opinion came as close to strict scrutiny as possible without actually embracing it"),
and Sunstein, supra note 157, at 73, 75 (noting that "Virginia heightens the level of scrutiny and
brings it closer to the 'strict scrutiny' that is applied to discrimination on the basis of race....
After United States v. Virginia... [s]tates must satisfy a standard somewhere between
intermediate and strict scrutiny."), with Hurd, supra note 157, at 49 (arguing that "[w]hile the
majority may conceivably include one or more justices who, if given their druthers, would ratchet
up the level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications, the written opinion shows no consensus for
such a change. Sex-based classifications are still to be judged by intermediate scrutiny, and
intermediate scrutiny still means what it meant before. The VMI decision did not turn on how
the majority viewed the law, but on how they viewed--or refused to view-the facts"); see also
Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 59, 60-61 (1997)
(discussing the ambiguous phrases used in the majority opinion and the possible interpretations
of each).
166. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
167. See, e.g., id. at 461 (holding, for a unanimous Court, that "[b]etween these extremes of
rational basis review and strict scrutiny lies a level of intermediate scrutiny, which generally has
been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy"). Both Clark and the
dissent of Justice Scalia in Virginia cite multiple cases using this approach. See Virginia, 518
U.S. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
168. The Court, for example, refers to its test as "skeptical scrutiny" and recognizes that the
Court "thus far" has reserved strict scrutiny for race and national origin, seemingly implying
that strict scrutiny may some day apply beyond its present bounds. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531,
532 n.6.
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quotes the standard of intermediate scrutiny, and, despite using the
term "exceedingly persuasive justification" throughout the opinion,
defines that term only by reference to the traditional intermediate
scrutiny test. 169 Finally, the Court notes that, unlike race or national
origin, sex does implicate real differences among people. 170
Accordingly, the Court concluded that sex is not a proscribed
classification in the same way that race is and that classifications
based on gender need not be considered under the same standard of
scrutiny.171
Such statements seem to imply an unwillingness on the part of
the Court to treat classifications based on sex in the same way as
classifications based on race. While it is possible that the Court will,
in future cases, explicitly declare classifications based on sex to be
subject to a higher standard than intermediate scrutiny, Virginia
alone does not support abandoning the intermediate scrutiny test.
Therefore, this Note will analyze single-sex education under the
traditional intermediate scrutiny standard.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION
Single-sex education is substantially related to the promotion
of three separate important government interests. 17 2 First, single-sex
education, particularly for girls, can decrease discrimination that
students face in the classroom. Second, single-sex education has the
potential to improve academic achievement, although commentators
169. Id. at 524 (stating as the test that "a party seeking to uphold government action based
on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification. To succeed,
the defender of the challenged action must show 'at least that the classification serves important
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives.'" (citations omitted)).
170. Id. at 533.
171. Id.
172. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 50, at 11278. The Office for Civil Rights describes
two important governmental objectives that are recognized under the proposed regulations. The
first, "to provide a diversity of educational options to students and parents," parallels the third
important interest I address. Id. The second objective recognized by the Office for Civil Rights,
"to meet the particular, identified educational needs of its students," seems broad enough to
address both educational needs to learn in an environment free from discrimination and
educational needs that are a part of academic achievement more broadly. Id.; see also id. at
11279 (noting that under this objective, a state could, "using reliable information and sound
educational judgment, determine that a single-sex class in a given subject is likely to provide
some students educational benefits." Even to the extent these regulations, if adopted, were read
more narrowly, Congress will always retain the ability to relax its requirements for the state's
objective to the constitutional limits. Each of the three interests I describe is within the
constitutional framework the Supreme Court has created. See infra Parts IV.A, B, C.
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and researchers disagree on whether and to what extent this is true.
Finally, single-sex education provides parents with more choices
among educational opportunities.
A. Preventing Discrimination in the Classroom
Many commentators agree that discrimination exists in
secondary-school classrooms, although they disagree as to whether
girls, boys, or both face this discrimination. 173 The Supreme Court has
recognized that preventing discrimination against women is an
important government interest.174 A policy discriminating against
men is not exempt from scrutiny. In fact, a classification that
discriminates against men is analyzed under the same standard of
review as a classification that discriminates against women. 175 As
education is "perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments" and is a "right which must be available to all on equal
terms,"176 the prevention of sex-based discrimination in public
secondary schools, whether against boys or girls, is an important
interest of the state government.
To satisfy the standard of scrutiny set forth in cases where a
classification is made on the basis of sex, not only must the
government's objective be important, but the classification must also
be substantially related to that important interest. 177 Thus, a state
must establish both the existence of discrimination based on sex in its
classrooms and that the maintenance of single-sex schools or classes is
substantially related to the government's interest in preventing that
discrimination.
1. Discrimination Against Girls
There is a great deal of evidence that girls experience
discrimination in a coeducational school setting. The classic
173. See infra Parts IV.A.1-.2.
174. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987). Rotary Club
characterizes preventing discrimination against women as a compelling state interest, id., so this
interest certainly achieves the lesser standard of "important" in intermediate scrutiny. See also
Lisa Denise Gladke, Note, The Fate of Women's Colleges: An Anti-Subordination Analysis, 18
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 195, 210 (1998) (noting two forms "exceedingly persuasive justifications"
by women's colleges can take: remediation for past discrimination and diversity of educational
opportunities).
175. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982).
176. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
177. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524; supra Part III.D.
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statement of the problem came from Myra and David Sadker, whose
research led them to conclude that
[t]eachers interact with males more frequently, ask them better questions, and give
them more precise and helpful feedback. Over the course of years the uneven
distribution of teacher time, energy, attention, and talent, with boys getting the lion's
share, takes its toll on girls ... . Girls are the majority of our nation's schoolchildren,
yet they are second-class educational citizens. The problems they face-loss of self-
esteem, decline in achievement, and elimination of career options-are at the heart of
the educational process. Until educational sexism is eradicated, more than half our
children will be shortchanged and their gifts lost to society. 1 78
While girls perform better than or equal to boys on almost all
standardized tests in the early grades, by the time girls graduate from
high school or college, they have fallen behind boys on standardized
test scores. They are also much less likely to be awarded state and
national college scholarships.1 79 When they later apply to graduate
schools, girls generally score lower than boys on admissions tests such
as the LSAT and the MCAT.180
Psychologist Mary Pipher has described girls in early
adolescence by saying that "[t]hey lose their resiliency and optimism
and become less curious and inclined to take risks. They lose their
assertive, energetic, and 'tomboyish' personalities and become more
deferential, self-critical and depressed. They report great unhappiness
with their own bodies."181 Dr. Pipher finds that "junior highs are not
user-friendly for adolescent girls."18 2 She maintains that most teachers
are well-intentioned and unaware that they discriminate against girls.
Nonetheless, after considering the research on teachers' differential
treatment of the sexes, she discovered ways that she herself
discriminated in the classroom. 8 3 As a result, Dr. Pipher argues that
"girls do better in cooperative environments and in all-girl Math and
Science classes. '184
178. MYRA & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 1
(1993).
179. Id. at 13-14.
180. Id.; see also AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS-THE
AAUW REPORT: A STUDY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ON GIRLS AND EDUCATION 3 (1992) (finding that
girls and boys enter school roughly equal in measured ability, but that twelve years later, girls
have fallen behind male classmates in areas such as higher level mathematics and measures of
self-esteem).
181. MARY PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 19 (1994).
182. Id. at 289.
183. Id. at 289-90.
184. Id. at 290. Dr. Pipher's conclusion is very similar in a sense to that of the task force in
the Virginia case. Like that group, she concludes that women in the aggregate do better in more
cooperative environments. Id. Presumably, however, even the absolute proof of this tendency
would not change the Supreme Court's opinion, as they are concerned not about whether the
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Not all researchers agree, however, that single-sex or
cooperative environments are the answer. In 1992, the American
Association of University Women ("AAUW") published a landmark
report detailing the problems that girls face in education.18 5 The
report cites studies and polls that found reductions in girls' self-
esteem and self-confidence as they moved from childhood to early
adolescence.186 It found, for example, that in the early grades, girls of
low socioeconomic status have better test scores than do boys of a like
background but, by high school, this difference disappears.18 7 The
AAUW also published a follow-up report, stressing that the deficits
and strengths identified in the original report were not innately male
or female. 88 Instead, the report argued that "opportunities and
expectations are shaped by social phenomena, notably the idea that
there are two genders, with oppositional characteristics."' 18 9 In 1998,
the AAUW concluded, after a review of research studies conducted
over two decades, that single-sex education was not the solution to
gender inequity in the classroom. 190 Despite the different conclusions
reached by Dr. Pipher and the AAUW as to the desirability of single-
sex opportunities, both agree that girls face discrimination in the
classroom and that this discrimination affects their performance and
happiness.191
tendency is accurate but about whether acting on the tendency harms those girls who do not fit
its assumptions.
185. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 180, at ix-xi.
186. Id. at 19. These studies most often focused on white, middle-class girls. Id. A survey of
the AAUW in 1990 found that only 29 percent of high school girls reported being "happy the way
I am"; this was in contrast to 60 percent of elementary school girls and 46 percent of high school
boys. Id.
187. Id. at 25.
188. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GENDER GAPS: WHERE SCHOOLS STILL FAIL OUR CHILDREN
5(1998).
189. Id.
190. Maggie Ford, Gender-Bias Study Does Not Advocate Single-Sex Education, WASH.
TIMES, May 19, 1999, at A18.
191. PIPHER, supra note 181, at 289-90. This conclusion spans the political spectrum, from
strong opponents of single-sex schooling to the strongest proponents. See, e.g., Bernice Sandler,
Symposium, Panel 1I: Constitutional, Statutory, and Policy Issues Raised by All-Female
Education: Publicly-Supported Single-Sex Schools and Policy Issues, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
61, 77-80 (1997) (noting that girls are not treated the same as boys in coed schools, but
concluding that the problem is in the way coed schools are operated, and the lack of programs to
train teachers not to discriminate and boys to respect women, and that single-sex schools are not
a solution to that systemic problem). But see Salomone, supra note 54, at 210-11 (noting the
arguments of proponents of single-sex schools that girls suffer from a "hidden curriculum" that
encompasses a "subtle but nonetheless harmful institutionalized program of male dominance,
differential teacher expectations, and attitudes that prepare students for gender-specific roles in
society.").
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The mere existence of discrimination, however, does not justify
a classification based on sex unless the classification is substantially
related to the prevention of discrimination. Discrimination occurs
both in single-sex and coeducational schools. 192 To some extent, it is
necessarily of different forms. While coeducational schools show
"gender domination and active discrimination against females," some
studies have shown that single-sex schools perpetuate "conventional
behaviors or styles typically associated with being male or female" and
promote the often subconscious sexism of linguistic uses and visual
displays. 193 While it is obviously impossible for teachers to call on
boys more in an all-female class, nothing prevents a teacher from
actively discriminating against female students by telling them that
they are not able to compete in male-dominated fields or that their
primary role must or should be as a mother. Some commentators thus
believe that the best solution is for schools to pursue active anti-
discrimination programs or policies rather than to institute a limited
number of single-sex schools. 194  These authors, however, often
disclaim solutions that might work, such as single-sex schooling, in
favor of the ideal, the complete elimination of discrimination in
society. Reliance on the achievement of this ideal to improve girls'
educational experiences renders any improvement in those
experiences virtually impossible. 95
192. See AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LOOK AT SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 6 (1998) (arguing that "creating a single-sex environment, or selecting a
single-sex school, does not necessarily mean that the environment will be free of sexism-that is,
a presumption of male superiority-or chosen for reasons of gender equity"). Individual
researchers participating in the AAUW report also described sexism as "rampant" or "persistent"
in single-sex classrooms. Id.
193. Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 495 (1999).
194. Valorie K. Vojdik, Girls' Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POLY 69, 94 (1997) (noting as possible other solutions to gender bias sending girls
to summer conferences on math and science, which has been shown to increase their interest; or
using such techniques as "pausing before calling on students, which encourages girls to
volunteer, or advising students to take a minute to consider a question before responding, which
similarly increases girls' participation."); see also Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex Education:
Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 703 (quoting Gael
Sherwin, former president of NOW, as saying in response to the argument that girls should be
placed in single-sex schools to avoid discrimination that "[iut's like when a woman is raped on the
street, some people say, 'Don't walk on the street.' The real answer is to make the streets safe.");
NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12 (suggesting that "investing resources in sexual harassment and
sex-equity training for students and teachers would be a much more constructive and effective
method of providing a long-term solution to this very real problem [of harassment and
discrimination]").
195. Vojdik, for example, proposes that
[g]iven the availability of successful alternatives to single-sex schools, it is difficult to
argue persuasively that the state must resort to segregating girls in order to offer
them an education free of discrimination. The problem is not with the girls; the
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Other authors believe that even teachers with the best of
intentions cannot completely avoid behaviors that negatively impact
one sex in a coeducational classroom. 196 Coeducation may be unable to
provide a sex-equitable classroom, while a single-sex environment
may be able to eliminate many of the forms of discrimination that
women face. 197 It is somewhat easier to ensure that teachers do not
have open prejudices against girls or boys than it is to ensure that
they do not subconsciously call on boys more. It would be rare for a
teacher who dislikes girls or thinks of them as unqualified to
voluntarily teach a class of only girls. Finally, the kind of open
discrimination that would still be a concern in an all-female class
would be somewhat easier to monitor, as girls are much more likely to
note that their teacher tells them they cannot do math than they are
to note that their teacher more frequently calls on boys. Even beyond
affecting the actions of teachers, all-female classes actively empower
girls by putting them in a position to be the "leaders, movers, and
doers."198
Perhaps most importantly, while single-sex schools may not
limit all forms of discrimination against girls, coeducational schools do
not seem to limit any of the possible forms of discrimination against
girls. One researcher, for example, reports hearing of a coeducational
classroom where the teacher told a female student who asked about
the lack of female inventors that a man's job was to invent, while a
woman's job was to "look beautiful so she can inspire him."'199
Coeducational schools offer the risk of conscious and substantial
sexism, such as this comment, which could be present in all-female
classes, as well as the risk of the well-meaning teacher who does not
problem is with the classroom and the school system. As argued below, to segregate
girls is to give up on them and to send the message that the responsible adults in
society are unable (or unwilling) to prevent discrimination in our public schools. That
is very disempowering indeed.
Vojdik, supra note 194, at 94. Responsible adults are, unfortunately, certainly unable to prevent
all discrimination in our public schools, as in society at large. Educating girls in an environment
free of discrimination, wherever that environment might be, gives girls the opportunity to learn
while being encouraged to fully participate and achieve, rather than being limited by
discrimination or by norms that put the boys in the positions of responsibility. Surely this is
itself empowering.
196. See, e.g., PIPHER, supra note 181, at 297.
197. RIORDAN, supra note 9, at 11 (quoting Jennifer Shaw as observing that "whereas
coeducation in principle offers equality of opportunity but in fact reduces the opportunity of
equality, single sex schools may offer genuine equality of opportunity in the highly unequal
society in which we live").
198. Whitney Ransome & Meg Milne Moulton, Why Girls' Schools? The Difference in Girl-
Centered Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 589, 598 (2001).
199. SADKER, supra note 178, at 7.
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realize that she responds more to boys.200 The offering of single-sex
girls' classes, then, is substantially related to decreasing
discrimination against girls in the classroom. 20 1 The opportunity to
compete for the teacher's attention absent subconscious gender biases
is sufficiently important to warrant state action, even if some forms of
discrimination may persist.
2. Discrimination Against Boys
While scholars have historically focused on educational
discrimination against girls, there are certainly scholars who believe
that it is boys, not girls, who are falling behind in the classroom.
20 2
Often, this discussion focuses on low-income, minority boys and on
addressing the problems of substance abuse and crime in the inner
cities. 20 3 Christina Hoff Sommers has argued that a boy today has the
following experience:
The allegedly silenced and neglected girl sitting next to him is likely to be a better
student. She is not only more articulate, she is probably a more mature, engaged, and
well-balanced human being. He may be uneasily aware that girls are more likely to go
on to college. He may believe that teachers prefer to be around girls and pay more
attention to them. At the same time, he is uncomfortably aware that he is considered to
be a member of the unfairly favored "dominant gender.
' 2 0 4
Boys are behind girls in reading and writing, are less committed to
school, and are increasingly less likely to go to college. 205
Many commentators disagree with the idea that coeducational
systems discriminate against boys. They argue that "coeducational
classrooms.., enhance male achievement.., reflect the values,
perspectives, and practices of the dominant male culture ... favoring
men's participation and perpetuating male dominance. ' 20 6  Such
commentators argue that boys could not be any more advantaged in a
200. Id. at 5.
201. See RIORDAN, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that "sex bias in single-sex schools will be
minimized" and that "beyond questions of admission, single-sex schools obviously do not
discriminate by sex in providing educational opportunity"); see also Gladke, supra note 174, at
215 (arguing that women's colleges provide women with a curriculum controlled by women, a
mode of learning that gives everyone a chance to succeed, female mentors and role models, and
an environment that produces female leaders).
202. See CHRISTINE HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST Boys: How MISGUIDED FEMINISM IS
HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN (2000).
203. See Salomone, supra note 54, at 214-15; see also id. at 228 (citing the studies of
Cornelius Riordan for the proposition that it is poor, African-American and Hispanic females
that benefit the most in single-sex schools, with slightly diminished effects for poor, African-
American and Hispanic males).
204. SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 43.
205. Id. at 14.
206. Gladke, supra note 174, at 221.
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single-sex classroom than they already are in a coeducational
classroom. 20 7  Sommers argues that this perspective fails to
understand boys and the problems they face, whereas looking to other
countries, such as Great Britain and Australia, can show the United
States how to begin addressing these problems. 208 Other developed
countries have taken action to consider the problems boys face more
quickly than has the United States. 209 Australia has begun a
parliamentary investigation into boys' education. 21 0 The British
government has commissioned a report on gender differences,
performance, and achievement. 211 Germany has established boys
programs outside of school, and Japan has focused on "men's
studies."212
Sommers is not alone in her belief that an increasing focus
should be put on boys, although many scholars who agree with some of
what she says nonetheless believe that some legitimate discrimination
exists that harms girls. 213 Several clinical psychologists argue,
however, that "the structure and behavioral expectations of most
coeducational schools, particularly elementary schools, tend to favor
female students."214 Carol Gilligan, an educational psychologist who
was a primary source of difference feminism, 21 5 has noted recently
that her research results "do not lend themselves to simple statements
such as 'Girls are thriving' or 'Girls are at risk.'. . . Girls and boys are
strong and vulnerable, although in somewhat different ways. 21 6
207. Id.
208. SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 15. Sommers notes that the British government has
introduced a program in primary schools intended to help boys catch up with girls, and that the
British are experimenting with male single-sex classes in coeducational schools. Id. She quotes
the British Education Minister as having said, while a Member of Parliament, that "If we do not
start to address the problem young men and boys are facing we have no hope." Id. at 16. In
contrast, she claims that no groups in the United States are addressing boys' problems, as the
mood in the United States is "contentious and Ideological and shaped by the girl advocates." Id.




213. See id. at 79 (citing Diane Ravitch, who has been a critic of the AAUW's "phony crisis,"
yet believes that "social and economic inequities continue to burden women")
214. Id. at 81 (summarizing DAN KINDLON & MICHAEL THOMPSON, RAISING CAIN:
PROTECTING THE EMOTIONAL LIFE OF BoYS (1999) and WILLIAM POLLACK, REAL BOYS: RESCUING
OUR SONS FROM THE MYTHS OF BOYHOOD (1998)).
215. See id. at 53-54 (describing Gilligan's basic two points as "women differ from men in
their fundamental orientation to life" and that "existing psychological theories devalued women's
orientation"). Salomone describes Gilligan's view as inspiring a school of thought that "rather
than women accommodating to the male norm, social institutions would have to change to
accommodate women's lives." Id. at 56.
216. Id. at 82 (quoting Gilligan).
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While not all commentators agree that boys face discrimination
in the classroom, historical discrimination against girls does not
authorize ignoring problems boys may face. The state has an interest
in ensuring that neither sex faces discrimination, and that the
educational system serves the needs of each sex. If an all-male
environment helps to prevent the discrimination against boys that
occurs when a teacher shows preference to girls, does not expect
achievement and college attendance out of many boys, or is unable to
run the class in a way that best serves boys, then providing boys the
option of an all-male environment can be constitutional.
B. Providing a Better Education for Students
A second important governmental objective that might be
served by single-sex schools is the improvement of the academic
education received by students.217 Across the nation, school districts
are failing their students and struggling to provide a basic
education.218  As noted above, providing education is a vitally
important role of state and local governments. 2 9 Education is crucial
to performing basic public responsibilities, being a good citizen,
appreciating cultural values, being prepared for professional training,
and adjusting normally to the surrounding environment. 220 Education
is crucial to success in life.221
217. To some extent, this overlaps with the prevention of discrimination. When teachers call
on girls less and expect less of them, the lowered attention and expectations can obviously affect
the girls' academic experience. However, improvement of academic experience also constitutes a
separate problem. Rather than focusing on the lowered academic performance that results from
treating boys and girls differently, it focuses on the academic value to students of being educated
in ways that studies show have tended to work for more members of their sex, rather than
attempting to teach all students in the same way.
218. See, e.g., Alexa Aguilar, Tax Boost for Schools Is Essential, Education Funding Panel
Advises; But Governor's Office Says Blagojevich Has No Plans to Push for Such a Move, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 19, 2003, at Bi (citing the former state superintendent of Illinois as
saying that Illinois must increase sales and income taxes if it hopes to save the failing Illinois
school system); Ronnie Lynn, Numbers Crunch; Watch out, Utah: 100,000 more students are
coming; Schools Face Onslaught, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 12, 2003, at Ai (citing the State
Superintendent Steve Laing as estimating that at least 60 percent of Utah's public schools could
be considered failing under the federal education standards).
219. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see supra Part IV.A.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also Daniel Gardenswartz, Public Education: An Inner-City Crisis! Single-Sex
Schools: An Inner-City Answer?, 42 EMORY L.J. 591, 595 (1993) (citing the following three basic
themes behind the operation of the public school system: "(1) the desire to train individuals to be
'good citizens' in a democratic society; (2) the desire to bolster the economic viability of the cities
and state that fund the public school systems; and (3) the desire to promote social harmony and
economic equality").
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The extent to which single-sex education improves the quality
of the educational experience for students is a matter of great debate.
In Virginia, the Supreme Court recognized at least some value to
single-sex education, noting that "single-sex education affords
pedagogical benefits to at least some students.., and that reality is
uncontested in this litigation. 222 Many commentators, however, argue
that the effects of a single-sex environment on the learning process
remain unclear. 223 Perhaps the most extensive catalogue of existing
studies was compiled by Nancy Levit. She concluded that, for girls,
more recent evidence suggests that there are no educational benefits
from single-sex education, a conclusion that contradicted earlier
studies.224 Levit also concluded that existing studies show that single-
sex schools have impacts on boys that are at best neutral and at worst
negative. She notes findings of sexism in all-boys' schools. 225 The fear
of sexism in all-male schools is a common theme among many
critics. 226 Additionally, many commentators believe that schools such
as the Young Women's Charter School in Chicago succeed more
because of their increased monetary resources than because of their
single-sex nature. 227 Similarly, the self-selection of students, who
choose to participate in experimental education programs designed to
enhance their educational experience, may also be a factor.228
222. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535 (1996).
223. Ellen Goodman, Single-Sex Schools Are Not the Solution; Beware the Pitch for
"Flexibility,' as Backsliding Is Not Innovation, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 22, 2002, at A-
27.
224. Levit, supra note 193, at 485-92.
225. Id. at 499-500 (citing studies finding that "the severest sexism was found in boys'
schools"; an expert witness from the Citadel litigation who believed that the all-male atmosphere
could create a "hypermasculine ethos" and men who felt superior to women; a possibility of
stereotypic views regarding innate abilities in particular subjects; an "institutional structure"
that "may encourage the view of male exclusivity and dominance"). Single-sex classes would
presumably have the same problem, as they would still have the all-male atmosphere that could
lead to the "hypermasculine ethos." There is some possibility-which we do not have the
evidence to fully consider-that the presence of women in the building, though in different
classes, might limit the likelihood that boys would perceive the subject areas they studied as all-
male preserves, as they would be aware of female enrollment in the same classes.
226. NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12 (arguing that "all-boys schools promote sexism and
feelings of superiority toward women"). Again, presumably this feeling is consistent for most
opponents of all-male education even in the context of single-sex classes. While some
commentators might draw a distinction, there are certainly many who seem to believe that all-
male education is, in whatever form, negative.
227. Greg Toppo, White House at Odds with Groups over Single-Sex Schools, DESERT NEWS,
Sept. 17, 2002, at A05.
228. AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 192, at 5 (citing Cornelius Riordan as crediting
positive outcomes of single-sex schools to the characteristics of students that attend such schools;
e.g., the pro-academic choice they make to go there).
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There are also numerous voices supporting the conclusion that
single-sex environments improve the educational experience, however.
In countries where more single-sex schools exist, such as England and
New Zealand, studies have found increased academic achievement in
single-sex schools. 229 Proponents argue that single-sex education not
only limits distractions, provides discipline and role models, and
fosters positive reinforcement, but also deals with the cognitive
differences between boys and girls without labels and stereotypes. 230
To some researchers, empirical evidence seems to favor single-sex
schools for academic outcomes. 231  Additionally, individuals who
actually attended single-sex schools, as well as their parents, testify
that girls are happier and more successful in single-sex schools. 232
229. Press Release, National Foundation for Educational Research, The Impact of School
Size and Single-sex Education on Performance (July 9, 2002) (finding, in a study of secondary
schools in England, that "girls' schools help to counter traditional sex-stereotyping in subject
choices; girls in single-sex comprehensive schools perform better than girls in mixed
comprehensives; boys with low prior attainment achieve slightly better results at GCSE in boys'
schools than in mixed comprehensives"), http://www.nfer.ac.uk/researcblpub-template.asp?theID
=289; see also Jadwiga S. Sebrechts, Single-Sex Education: Expecting More, and Getting It,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 2002, at El.
230. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Separate, But Not Equal, Say Some Single-Sex Education
Opponents (Fox News Channel broadcast, Sept. 24, 2002); see also RIORDAN, supra note 9, at 39
(noting as possible benefits claimed by single-sex education advocates role modeling; promotion
of traditional masculine and feminine needs of students; less channeling of students into fields
traditionally thought suitable for them; teacher-student interaction in the classroom; less
occurrence of sex-stereotypes in peer interaction; minimization of obsession with physical
attractiveness and heterosexual popularity; control and discipline; satisfaction of parents for
whom religious grounds demand separation); Ransome & Moulton, supra note 198, at 596.
Ransome and Moulton cite a study done by Goodman Research Group of girls' school alumnae.
Id. The data reflected that "alumnae placed an enormous value on their education at girls'
schools. They remained confident in their abilities. They identified themselves as academic
achievers. They credited their girls' schools as the places where they learned to recognize and
harness their talents and potentials." Id.; see also Erin a. McGrath, Note, The Young Women's
Leadership School: A Viable Alternative to Traditional Coeducational Public Schools, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 455, 476-77 (1998) (describing some of the academic achievements of the all-female
Young Women's Leadership School in East Harlem).
231. RIORDAN, supra note 9, at 61. Riordan notes that "girls in single-sex schools, especially,
seem to obtain higher cognitive outcomes than their counterparts in mixed-sex schools." Id.
232. NBC News, Matt Lauer, co-host, Education Today: Professor Diane Ravitch of New York
University and Norman Siegel of the New York Civil Liberties Union Debate the Issue of Single-
Sex Public Schools (NBC broadcast, Aug. 27, 1997). NBC interviewed Nikki Lessner, an 8th grade
student at the Young Women's Leadership School in New York City, who said that "[i]f I was
called on in class, asked something and I got it wrong, boys would put you down, they'll tease you
and make fun of you. But the girls, they don't do that, because they don't-if you don't know
something, they'll help you instead of teasing you." Id. Cydnee Couch, another 8th grade student,
said "Since there aren't boys in the class, we learn more, the classes were more fun." Id. A third
student, Lauren Labiosa, said "A lot of us won't feel as intimidated as we were in our previous
schools." Id. Couch's aunt said that Cydnee's grades increased, as did her interest in school and
her self-esteem; Labiosa's mother said that "I am thrilled and feel very fortunate that my
daughter is part of it." Id.
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Increasing public interest in single-sex schools further reflects their
positive reputation. 233
Reconciling the opposing views of commentators on single-sex
education is beyond the scope of this Note. In effect, the "truth," if
such a thing exists, of the value of single-sex programs is not
determined with enough accuracy to gain a reasonable consensus, as
evidenced by the disagreement over the issue. 234 At least one
commentator has argued that "whether single-sex classes and schools
ultimately are upheld as constitutional probably will turn on the social
science evidence justifying their efficacy." 235  The National
Organization for Women ("NOW") has argued that the constitutional
inquiry requires more evidence of the efficacy of single-sex
education. 236 On the other hand, a Department of Education official
argued that "[i]t's difficult to study these things with any real
scientific basis until you've got a body of evidence."237  Rosemary
Salomone also argues that it is irrational and circular to refuse to
allow single-sex education merely because there is insufficient
evidence supporting its benefits yet at the same time maintain legal
constraints on its exercise that effectively prevent the gathering of
supporting evidence. 238
Even if the Supreme Court could draw a conclusion from the
available studies, it is debatable whether the Court's reconciliation of
extensive and complicated studies should rise to the level of a
constitutional pronouncement. In Brown v. Board of Education, the
233. See Stefanie Weiss, Sex and Scholarship; Across the Country, Educators Are Asking If
Boys, Girls, and Learning Don't Mix, WASH. POST, July 21, 2002, at W18. Weiss notes that in the
fall of 2002 there were sixteen public single-sex schools, in contrast to only eleven in 2001. Id.
She further notes that the National Coalition of Girls' Schools claims a 23.5 percent increase in
enrollment in a fixed number of girls' schools from 1991 to 2001, while the National Association
of Independent Schools notes no change. Id. The U.S. Department of Education has data showing
an increase of 5 percent for girls and 7 percent for boys in 1999-2000 over the previous two years.
Id. Additionally, Weiss notes that three Washington area single-sex private schools have claimed
large increases in applicants over the past decade: National Cathedral School (18 percent),
Madeira (28 percent), and Gonzaga College High School (doubled in the past eight years). Id.
234. It is important to note that there does not need to be a "truth" that single-sex schools or
classes are "good" for students in order for them to be a good policy option; if it is true that they
are good for some students, that is sufficient to authorize the states pursuing them as an option
for parents to consider.
235. Levit, supra note 193, at 454.
236. See generally NOW Comments, supra note 12.
237. Toppo, supra note 227.
238. Salomone, supra note 54, at 228-29; see also SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 177 (arguing
that "at this time we simply don't know whether single-sex classes are the key to a better
pedagogy for boys. Nor are we likely to find out in the near future so long as girl-partisan




court relied in part on the psychological authority of the time to
illustrate the detrimental effect of state racial segregation in public
education. 239 NOW argues that separation by sex, like separation by
race, develops a sense of inferiority in girls, the "traditionally
subordinated group."240  Such a conclusion might render single-sex
schools indistinguishable from the racially segregated schools held
unconstitutional in Brown.241 In Brown, however, the Court had
found general agreement in the psychological literature that racial
segregation was harmful to black children. 242 One scholar commented
that it was "background knowledge of educated men who live[d] in the
world" that segregation was intended to keep blacks inferior. 243 In
contrast, in the context of single-sex education, the Court would be
required to sort through a myriad of conflicting studies to try to draw
a conclusion on the basis of studies that seem inconclusive to those
whose expertise is in drawing such conclusions. In such a case,
deference to the educational institution seems appropriate.
A recent example of such deference is found in Grutter v.
Bollinger.244 While the majority of amici who were educators filed
briefs supporting the University of Michigan Law School, other amici
239. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954). The court quoted the district court
as having found that
[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater where it has the sanction of the law;
for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority
of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. at 494.
240. NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12, at 2.
241. See Levit, supra note 193, at 517 (arguing that "separation on the basis of Identity
characteristics creates feelings of inadequacy and instills beliefs about group hierarchy.
Government separation of equals sends the message that something is contaminative about the
presence of the opposite sex."). But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing, in the context of race, that the psychological effect on members of a
particular race is "irrelevant to the question whether state actors have engaged in intentional
discrimination-the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of the Equal Protection Clause").
242. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 & n.ll.
243. Charles L. Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424-26
(1960); see also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741 n.9 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "sexual segregation in education differs from the tradition ... of
'separate but equal' racial segregation. It was characteristic of racial segregation that segregated
facilities were offered, not as alternatives to increase the choices available to blacks, but as the
sole alternative.").
244. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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favored the plaintiffs position.245 One amicus attacked the claims of
the value of diversity to education and argued that
common sense and classroom experiences demonstrate that "viewpoint diversity" and
"academic diversity" in the classroom are not affected by the racial composition of a
student body .... [R]acial diversity is not required to foster a full discussion of issues
and viewpoints in the classroom.... Even if one were to hypothesize that a compelled
increase in racial diversity would increase educationally valuable viewpoint diversity to
some degree, it would also generate educationally detrimental stigma and hostility
based on precisely the same type of stereotyping regarding race employed by the
University.
2 4 6
In considering the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law
School's affirmative action program, however, the Court cited amici
who supported the program, noting that
the educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce ... are substantial....
[The] admissions policy promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break down
racial stereotypes, and "enables students to better understand persons of different
races.". . . "[C]lassroom discussion is livelier, more spirited, and simply more
enlightening and interesting" when the students have "the greatest possible variety of
backgrounds."... [N]umerous studies show that student body diversity promotes
learning outcomes .... 
2 4 7
The Court, while resolving this social science debate in favor of the
University, also indicated that its resolution was at least somewhat
based on the Court's deference to the University's educational
judgment:
The Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its
educational mission is one to which we defer. The Law School's assessment that
diversity will, in fact, yield educational benefits is substantiated by respondents and
their amici. Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is no less strict for
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within
the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within constitutionally
prescribed limits.
2 48
If the Court is willing to find strict scrutiny satisfied through
deference to "complex educational judgments," the complex
educational judgments of educators that single-sex education is
valuable should surely satisfy the lower standard of intermediate
scrutiny. On the other hand, the Grutter Court seemingly concluded
that the evidence available supported the conclusion that diversity has
educational benefits, rather than simply deferring to the Law School's
245. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Larry Alexander et al., Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Michigan Ass'n of Scholars, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
246. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Larry Alexander et al. at 12-13, 15, Grutter (No.
02-241).
247. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
248. Id.
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conclusion.249 Thus, the Court may still attempt to reconcile the
available studies on single-sex education into a conclusion on its
efficacy that is not necessarily sufficiently supported by the evidence,
rather than simply deferring to the judgment of the school.
If, however, lower courts and the Supreme Court are willing to
concede either that the effectiveness of single-sex schooling is yet
undetermined or that single-sex schooling is of value to some students,
then experimentation itself, by aiding the states in pursuing
conclusive evidence regarding the effectiveness of single-sex schooling,
can be substantially related to the state's goal of providing a better
education. The Supreme Court has indicated its policy of deference
toward educational experimentation, noting that
the ultimate wisdom as to ... [certain] problems of education is not likely to be divined
for all time even by the scholars who now so earnestly debate the issues ... [T]he
judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional
restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and
experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to
keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.
2 5 0
If the claims of the most positive studies are to be believed, then the
goal of better education is directly and substantially served by the
creation of single-sex educational opportunities. If those studies are
wrong, the goal of better education is ultimately served by discovering
that now, for the benefit of both public and private schools. That there
is a lack of sufficient evidence to make a conclusive determination
should preclude a Court-imposed ban on single-sex classes.251
249. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (noting that the Law School's assessment of the educational
benefits of diversity was supported by that of the amici); see also id. at 330 (noting that "[iun
addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show
that student body diversity promotes learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.' ").
250. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973).
251. See id. at 42-43. The court in Rodriguez held that
[iun addition to matters of fiscal policy, this case also involves the most persistent and
difficult questions of educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of
specialized knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with
the informed judgments made at the state and local levels. Education, perhaps even
more than welfare assistance, presents a myriad of "intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems." The very complexity of the problems of financing and
managing a statewide public school system suggests that "there will be more than one
constitutionally permissible method of solving them," and that, within the limits of
rationality, "the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled to
respect. On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational
experts are divided.
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C. Offering Choice or Diversity in Educational Opportunities
The government's third important interest, which also is
served by allowing single-sex classes, is the provision to parents of
diverse educational options for their children. The No Child Left
Behind Act was designed in part to create such options.252 Senator
Hutchison, the drafter of the single-sex schooling provision in the Act,
has argued that single-sex education should exist to give parents more
options to fulfill their children's needs. 253 While diversity of
educational opportunities was rejected as a possible justification for
the all-male nature of VMI, the Court said that it did not generally
question the ability of the State "evenhandedly to support diverse
educational opportunities." 254 Providing the option of enrolling in a
single-sex program-while not requiring it-obviously gives parents
an additional choice for their children. The Court has seemingly
recognized that provision of a diversity of educational choices as an
important state interest, even though it refused to believe diversity of
educational opportunities was the true aim of Virginia with VMI. 255
Opponents of single-sex education argue that it does not
promote diversity. Instead, groups such as NOW argue that when
children are segregated by sex, they do not have the benefit of a
diverse educational environment, with both boys and girls. 25 6 While a
single-sex class is clearly not diverse in the sense of offering both male
and female voices, this type of diversity is just as clearly not the sort
of diversity that proponents of single-sex education would present as a
state interest. Instead, proponents of single-sex education argue that
single-sex schools, while not right for all students, may be good for
some, and that parents should have an opportunity to choose from
many diverse educational institutions rather than being limited to
only one type, which may not work well for their child.
252. Dep't of Educ., supra note 35.
253. Hutchison, supra note 9, at 1076.
254. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.7 (1996); see also Elizabeth A. Douglas,
Note, United States v. Virginia: Gender Scrutiny Under an "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification"
Standard, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 173, 198 (1997) (arguing that "[tihe Court clearly is willing to
accept diversity as an important government interest despite the fact that, in this particular
case, VMI maintained its single-sex status not to diversify educational opportunities, but to carry
on the long-established tradition of favoring men over women. Single-sex institutions need not be
a thing of the past: If an all-male school and an all-female school were established
simultaneously and enjoyed equal funding and facilities, each institution could withstand an
equal protection challenge based on the important government interest in diversity of
educational choices.").
255. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7.
256. NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12.
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V. TECHNIQUES FOR ASSURING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SINGLE-
SEX EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES
While single-sex education is substantially related to important
government interests, limits nonetheless exist on how single-sex
opportunities can be constitutionally instituted. Single-sex education
is both more practical and easier to defend when implemented
through single-sex classes in coeducational schools rather than
through single-sex schools. 257 The vast differences between secondary
and postsecondary schools strengthen the case for single-sex education
at the secondary school level. 258  Justifying single-sex secondary
education is in many ways easier than justifying postsecondary,
specialized programs, which were at issue in Virginia and Mississippi
University for Women. Single-sex education is also more easily
justified under the Constitution when single-sex opportunities are
offered to both sexes.25 9 Finally, single-sex programs offered as an
option, rather than as a requirement, are more likely to be considered
constitutional.260
A. A Note on Comparability
Comparable educational opportunities for both sexes are
required both by Title IX and its regulations, and by the Constitution,
through case law.261 In noting that it did not address "separate but
equal" institutions, the Virginia Court avoided the question of
whether perfectly comparable institutions could constitutionally
separate the sexes. 262 It is clear, however, that the Court considers
the provision of vastly unequal programs for boys and girls or men and
257. See infra Part V.B.
258. See infra Part V.C.
259. See infra Part V.D.
260. See infra Part V.E.
261. 34 U.S.C. § 106.35(b) (2000); Office for Civil Rights; Single-Sex Classes and Schools:
Guidelines on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102 (May 8, 2002); Proposed Regulations,
supra note 50, at 11279 (noting that "a single-sex nonvocational class may be provided only if a
substantially equal coeducational class is provided to the other sex in the same subject. A
recipient may also choose to provide a substantially equal single-sex class for the other sex in the
same subject."). The proposed regulations, in addressing the comparability requirement for
single-sex schools, attempt to adopt the Supreme Court's standards, replacing the word
"comparable" with the phrase "substantially equal," used by Justice Ginsburg in Virginia, and
describing factors such as the "quality and range of extracurricular offerings, qualifications of
faculty and staff, geographic accessibility, and quality, accessibility, and availability of facilities
and resources." Proposed Regulations, supra note 50, at 11281-82; see supra Part III.C.
262. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n. 7 (1996).
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women to violate the Constitution.263 The Court cited the dissenting
opinion from the Fourth Circuit's consideration of Virginia, which
argued that parallel institutions should have "substantially
comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, funding,
physical plant, administration and support services... faculty, and
library resources."264 However, the majority failed to clarify whether
meeting this standard is sufficient to render parallel institutions
constitutional. Chief Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, explicitly
noted that the majority's statement of the requirements of
comparability of parallel institutions, if read as an exclusive
requirement, was "too stringent."265 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected
the implication of the majority that the State of Virginia could only
prevent a constitutional violation by making VMI coeducational:
the Court necessarily implies that the only adequate remedy would be the admission of
women to the all-male institution .... I would not define the violation in this way; it is
not the 'exclusion of women' that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but the
maintenance of an all-men school without providing any-much less a comparable-
institution for women.
26 6
Therefore, an appropriate remedy, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's eyes,
would be for the State to provide a comparable single-sex environment
for women, thus showing as strong of a desire to effectively educate
women as was shown with regard to educating men.267 Chief Justice
Rehnquist envisions that such a solution would not "require that the
women's institution offer the same curriculum as the men's; one could
be strong in computer science, and the other could be strong in liberal
arts. It would be a sufficient remedy, I think, if the two institutions
offered the same quality of education and were of the same overall
caliber. ' 268 A truly comparable institution would be sufficient to cure
what would otherwise be a constitutional deficiency.
Because the Virginia majority did not specify whether a
separate but equal school is actually sufficient, the mere existence of a
comparable program may not save single-sex secondary education
programs. However, the absence of a comparable program will
263. See, e.g., id. at 547 (noting that "[flor women only, however, Virginia proposed a
separate program, different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities").
264. Id. at 547 n. 17.
265. Id. at 563 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). While the Court seems to find the perfect
comparability (in the sense of the same programs, facilities, and offerings) of two single-sex
institutions to be necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, to their constitutionality, Chief
Justice Rehnquist seems to find satisfaction of such a strong standard of comparability sufficient,
but not necessary. Id.




certainly bother the Court, a majority of which at least implies
support of a stronger conception of comparability than Chief Justice
Rehnquist's conception. For example, if an all-girls school offered no
Math or Science courses but had a great English department, while a
supposedly comparable boys school offered no humanities classes, but
great Math and Science classes, the majority's focus on avoiding
stereotypes of boys' and girls' abilities would seem to force the
conclusion that the program was unconstitutional. A majority of the
Court would likely reach this conclusion even if the overall quality of
education was equal and thus satisfied Chief Justice Rehnquist. 269
Designing the two programs to be as similar as possible, while still
retaining the benefits of separate programming, provides the best
chance for single-sex education to be constitutionally upheld.
It is also important to note that if the Court adopts Justice
Scalia's approach and focuses on the traditional intermediate scrutiny
test for classifications based on sex, then the presence or absence of a
parallel institution for the other sex is irrelevant to satisfying the
standard of scrutiny on its face.270 The standard only requires that
the classification by sex serve an important government interest.
Many government interests, such as the interest in preventing
discrimination against girls in the classroom, could be served absent a
comparable single-sex offering for boys.271 However, a majority of the
Court seems committed to the necessity of comparable opportunities
for both sexes. Apparently, the Court is committed to a single-sex
environment for both if such an environment exists for either.
Even assuming that the focus stays on the intermediate
scrutiny test, however, as programs become less comparable-e.g., the
program for boys gets substantially better than the one for girls-
single-sex education no longer seems to be serving the important
government objectives that justify it. The important state interest of
preventing discrimination against girls is not being served at the point
where the education that is being offered to girls is substantially
269. Id. at 541 (noting that states may not rely on "fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females" to exclude qualified individuals). The Chief Justice does not
disagree with this, instead noting that states can consider overall interest when determining
curricula if they offer single-sex schools. Id. at 565-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). However,
decision making regarding class offerings can evaluate the interests of its students without
basing those decisions on stereotypes, and assuming a priori that there would be no interest in a
women's school of civil engineering or a men's school of nursing. Id.
270. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197 (1976) (recognizing that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives").
271. See infra Part V.D, discussing the pitfalls of offering single-sex opportunities to only one
sex.
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inferior to the education being offered to boys. Neither is the state
interest in improving educational experience furthered, at least for the
girls; the state cannot have an important government interest in
improving the education of one sex at the expense of the other.
Finally, when the classes offered to one sex provide an education
inferior to that provided to the other sex, the state is still successfully
giving parents and students some "choice," but the choice provided to
the sex choosing between a coeducational program and a weak single-
sex program is not the quality choice that parents want or deserve.
Therefore, parallel institutions offering single-sex opportunities
strengthen their case for constitutionality by offering programs to both
sexes that are as "comparable" as possible.
B. Single-Sex Classes: A More Appealing Constitutional Option,
Despite the Current Regulatory Bar
The constitutionality of single-sex secondary schools has been
extensively addressed by commentators, receiving the lion's share of
attention given to single-sex education. 272  However, single-sex
classrooms, if allowed by a revision of the Title IX regulations such as
that proposed by the Office for Civil Rights, provide a more appealing
alternative to single-sex schools, both in terms of practicality and
constitutionality. Single-sex schools may require constructing new
schools or shifting students from school to school, and may necessitate
children from the same family going to different schools to receive a
single-sex education. Single-sex classrooms, on the other hand,
provide many of the benefits of single-sex schools without requiring as
significant of a financial investment by local school districts. 273 In
some cases, single-sex classrooms could be instituted without any
increase in available resources. For example, rather than offering six
coeducational English classes to a given grade, a school could simply
revise its offerings to have the same teacher teach one all-girls class,
one all-boys class, and four coeducational classes; two all-girls classes,
two all-boys classes, and two coeducational classes; or any other
combination that best serves the interests of the school and the
student body.274
272. See supra Part II.D (arguing the different legal status of single-sex schools and classes,
as well as the more obvious single-sex nature of single-sex schools, accounts for the focus of the
scholarship).
273. See SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 177 (arguing that "[s]ingle-sex classes do not cost
substantially more than mixed classes").
274. Instituting classes in some disciplines could result in smaller classes and hence greater
cost. For example, seventy-five students could be divided into three coed classes of twenty-five
students; if twenty opt for an all-female class and twenty for an all-male class, the thirty-five
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Additionally, single-sex classrooms can more easily be designed
to meet the Virginia standards than can single-sex schools. Because
the Court has not been clear on the extent to which schools must be
comparable in order for the classification to be constitutional, schools
are best-served by providing all students with as comparable an
education as possible. This can often be a difficult task. If, for
example, single-sex schools are instituted in existing buildings, one of
which has a substantially better science lab then the other, assigning
one lab to girls and one lab to boys will necessarily lead to one sex
having an inferior facility, unless substantial resources are expended
to equalize the facilities.27 5 The problem in Virginia-the existence of
a high caliber all-male institution and the impossibility of creating a
copy of it-is similar to this example. When the comparison, however,
is within one school, which has the same resources and facilities
available to both sexes, the difficult problems of comparability become
at least somewhat less difficult, as many of the tangible and
intangible features are not only comparable, but necessarily
equivalent.
Single-sex secondary schools, as opposed to schools with single-
sex classrooms, also face hard questions if, for example, there is
insufficient demand for a particular class in one of the single-sex
schools. If there is not enough demand to constitute a class among
boys either for Advanced Placement Calculus or for Advanced
Placement English, while both exist at the girls' school, the school
system needing to provide a comparable education will have difficulty
doing so. What might make for a very difficult constitutional problem
in a single-sex school-where the boys have no opportunity to enroll in
Advanced Placement classes in Calculus or English, while the girls
have that opportunity-could be more easily remedied in a single-sex
classroom environment. The school could simply make its highest
classes, with the lowest demand, coeducational.2 7 6 Similarly, while
both the all-boys school and the all-girls school might have too few
students remaining would probably need to be split into two coed classes. Thus, offering single-
sex classes would require an increase in resources, as the school would have to offer four classes
rather than three. Overall, however, this increase in resources would probably not be
substantial, and certainly not as substantial as the increase in resources required by the
construction of a new school.
275. See Sandler, supra note 191, at 71.
276. It seems likely that Chief Justice Rehnquist, while he would not mind comparable
single-sex public universities excelling in different disciplines, might view differently a secondary
school which offered an advanced Math class to males and not to females. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,
562-63, 565 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). While different colleges can excel in different
areas and attract people interested in those areas, secondary schools, as the only provider of
public education in their geographic area, need to offer to both sexes quality options in major
disciplines. Id.
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interested students to offer a particular class, a coeducational school
with single-sex classes could make that advanced class available as a
coeducational class. In this situation, the boys and the girls would
then get a better education than would have been possible in a strictly
single-sex school.
C. Single-Sex Classes in Secondary Schools: A More Constitutionally
Sound Option that those in Institutions of Higher Education
Virginia and MUW both concerned the admissions policies of
postsecondary schools. Specifically, the program in each case was
highly specialized. VMI focused on a military education with a unique
method of teaching, while MUW focused on a nursing education.
Secondary schools, while still meriting similar constitutional scrutiny,
differ in three primary ways from postsecondary institutions. Overall,
these differences alleviate some of the concerns that opponents have
about the risk of allegedly "separate but equal" educational programs
not actually being equal.
1. Comparability of Opportunities
The first difference between programs in secondary schools and
those in colleges and universities is that most secondary schools in a
given geographic area offer substantially similar curricula. With some
exceptions, such as magnet or specialized interest schools (schools of
fine arts, for example, or of Math and Science), secondary schools
target a basic core education that includes Math, English, Science,
and Social Science.277
The similarity in the basic curricula of secondary schools
simplifies the tasks of creating and judicially evaluating the
comparable opportunity mandated in Virginia. Clearly, not all
secondary schools are equal. Newberg v. Board of Public Education, a
State court case considering the schools at issue at Vorchheimer,
provides a good example of two secondary schools serving the same
277. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, HIGH SCHOOL ACADEMIC CURRICULUM AND
THE PERSISTENCE PATH THROUGH COLLEGE: PERSISTENCE AND TRANSFER BEHAVIOR OF
UNDERGRADUATES 3 YEARS AFTER ENTERING 4-YEAR INSTITUTIONS 3 (2001) (citing NAT'L
COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK (1983)), at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubId= 2001163. The National Center for Education
Statistics set as the lowest threshold of a high school academic curriculum the core New Basics
curriculum set forth in A NATION AT RISK: Four years of English, three years of Mathematics,
three years of Science, three years of Social Studies, and one-half year of Computer Science. Id.
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basic area but having vastly different resources.278  However,
secondary schools are also much less likely to offer a highly specific,
unique educational opportunity, such as an "adversative method," or
to have a highly specialized program in a field, such as nursing, than
are institutions of higher learning. It is extremely difficult to compare
an outstanding engineering school to one known for its business
programs, or a college known for its teaching of technical skills to a
liberal arts school.279 In contrast, most high schools merely require
comparisons of variations on the same programs rather than
comparisons between different programs entirely. That is, while VMI
and MUW offered programs that were not attainable anywhere else
nearby-for VMI an intensive military education and for MUW a
nursing program-the schools in Newberg were different in only
library size, campus resources, and teacher qualifications. 28 0
Some differences more difficult to value do exist among
secondary school programs. For example, in Newberg, Central High
had a four-year Russian language program not offered at Girls' High,
while Girls' High had advanced courses in French and Spanish not
offered at Central High.281 Generally, however, enough easily
comparable facts-such as the quality or depth of the schools' offerings
in core subjects, the expertise of the teachers in those fields, and the
success of its students on national standardized tests-are available
for a meaningful comparison. Thus, comparing programs will often be
easier in the context of secondary schools, where most schools serve a
geographic market of those with varying interests rather than serving
an interest market. This difference makes the maintenance of parallel
secondary programs less worrisome than the maintenance of parallel
universities.
278. Newberg v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 26 Pa. D. & C.3d 682, 703 (C.P. 1983). The court found
that the all-male school had 2.7 times as many faculty Ph.D.'s and 1.5 times as many teachers
with twenty-one years or more of teaching experience than did the all-female school; that the
boys' campus was three times as large as the girls' campus; that the boys' school had a library
almost twice as large as the girls' library; that only the boys' school had a computer room; and
that the average SAT score at the boys' school was higher in both the verbal and math
components than the SAT scores at the girls' school. Id. The court concluded that incomplete or
no evidence of these facts had been produced in the earlier litigation. Id.
279. Chief Justice Rehnquist gives some indication that he would consider two such schools
comparable if they were of the same overall quality. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 565 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring). However, when two schools offer substantially different programs, it is not only
unclear whether other members of the Court would consider these schools comparable, but also
unclear how one would measure whether the programs were of substantially the same caliber in
their individual fields.
280. Newberg, 26 Pa. D. & C.3d at 703.
281. Id. at 688.
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2. The Lack of Choice Among Secondary Schools
The second important difference between primary and
secondary schools, on one hand, and colleges and universities, on the
other, is that public primary and secondary schools are "generally
obligated by law to educate all students who live within defined
geographic boundaries." 28 2  The constitution of nearly every State
guarantees its citizens the right to a free primary and secondary
education. 28 3  In contrast, at most universities, even public ones,
students who wish to attend must pay for their educational expenses
and have only limited government funding available. 28 4
The implication of this guarantee of basic education is that
while students have wide choices as to what public university to
attend (although often constrained by cost, location, and other factors),
primary and secondary school students rarely choose which school to
attend. The state's first concern is supplying all of its residents with a
suitable primary and secondary education rather than offering options
of schools to suit each person's individual desires. The lack of choice
residents have over where to attend primary and secondary school
could result in more concern over single-sex programs in such schools.
Single-sex classes must therefore be scrutinized with an eye to
the fact that the students who disapprove of the single-sex education
method may have no option of selecting another school.285 In this
sense, Secondary schools may be more constitutionally worrisome than
are colleges. While Virginia may have been able to defend VMI if the
State had a school for women that offered similar opportunities (such
that VMI was not a unique institution), the state, when providing
secondary schools, must offer boys and girls comparable opportunities
within the same district.28 6 The Court may not always be willing to
282. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 664 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
283. Id. Justice Kennedy cited to the specific state constitutional provisions in seventeen
states. Id.
284. See Mary Leonard, College Tuition, Fees Rise by 9.6%, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2002, at
A2 (stating that the average tuition for a public, four-year college rose to $4,081 in Fall 2002).
285. This is true, albeit to a lesser extent, even if, as argued infra Part V.E, school districts
offer coed classes as well as single-sex classes, since single-sex classes that promote any notion of
inferiority of one sex will undoubtedly disturb concerned parents, even if their children are
taking the coed classes, because of the attitude that the single-sex classes promote at the school
where their children are enrolled.
286. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 n.7 (1996) (noting that the Court does
not address the state's ability "evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities," but
addresses only a "unique" opportunity, available only at Virginia's premier military institute, its
only single-sex public university or college). To the extent that Virginia had offered single-sex
education that also provided exceptional opportunities for women, comparable to those that were
offered at VMI, the case would have presented a different issue, even if the opportunity for
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look statewide, even in the context of colleges; in MUW, the court
found that even the existence of a nursing school elsewhere in the
state was insufficient to justify the exclusive nature of the
University. 2 7 However, the implication in Virginia was that if it had
been possible to construct a truly comparable all-female school, it
could have been located anywhere in the state. The opinion speaks in
terms of the educational opportunities in the state of Virginia rather
than in more local terms.288 In the context of secondary schools, the
comparison will never be more than district wide. It is therefore
desirable for school districts to offer options other than single-sex
schools and classes, so that students are left with a choice as to
whether to enroll in a single-sex program at all.28 9 Whether the
increased concern over the lack of choice is enough to make single-sex
classes in secondary programs more worrisome than those single-sex
classes in postsecondary schools will depend on the analysis of the
relative ease of comparability, the lack of choice, and the strength of
the government interest served by the single-sex option.
women was in a different part of the state. But see id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the absence of an all-female analogue to VMI is irrelevant, and that in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan the Court had attached no significance to the absence of an all-male nursing
school). It may be less important to members of the Court whether there is actually a comparable
all-female institution than it is to evaluate whether the state is genuinely and sincerely serving
an important government interest; in Virginia, the absence of a comparable all-female
institution undermined the state's sincerity.
287. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982) (noting that although the
plaintiff could have attended another nursing school, that would have required considerable
travel, and a similarly situated female would not have been forced to deal with that
inconvenience to get an education).
288. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539-40 (noting that Virginia's policy cannot satisfy equal
protection when Virginia's claimed goal of "diversity" serves the men of the state, without the
state making any provision for women). The Court does not necessarily seem to believe that a
counterpart institution could have been created that would have had the same tangible and
intangible qualities. However, rather than focusing on the location of Mary Baldwin College, the
Court only noted that the program at the VWIL was insufficient to satisfy equal protection
because it was "different in kind from VMI and unequal in tangible and intangible facilities." Id.
at 547. The Court may be assuming that, in contrast to Mississippi University for Women, the
demand for the education at VMI is very small, and thus prospective students cannot reasonably
maintain an expectation of such a school existing within the convenient distance required of a
comparable nursing school in MUW. Additionally, the required dorm life at VMI differs from the
commute while maintaining a full-time job conceived by MUW. See id. at 522; Miss. Univ. for
Women, 458 U.S. at 723 n.8; see also Virginia, 518 U.S. at 563 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(stating that if Virginia had made a genuine effort to devote comparable resources to a facility for
women, it might well have avoided an equal protection violation).
289. For discussion of the appropriateness of requiring students to take single-sex classes,
see infra Part V.E.
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3. The Strength of Government Interests
The final important difference between primary and secondary
schools, on the one hand, and universities, on the other, is that
evidence of differences in how boys and girls learn is more compelling
with respect to younger children, as are arguments regarding the
distraction created by the presence of the opposite sex. 290 The time
when these problems are most serious-in primary and secondary
schools-is the time when single-sex education can have the greatest
positive effect. Therefore, in the early years of education, a stronger
connection exists between the important government interest of
improving educational outcome and the gender classification. Thus,
shifting the context to primary and secondary schools strengthens the
case that single-sex education supports the important government
interest of improving the quality of education.
Likewise, discrimination against one sex is presumably more of
a problem at a younger age. Mary Pipher, for example, stresses the
difficulties that girls face in early adolescence. 291 It is during this time
that they begin to try to understand the culture around them and deal
with the different society that many girls now face in middle
schools.292  Particularly in highly objective disciplines, such as
mathematics, the college student who encounters a discriminatory
professor will likely be better able to recognize when the professor is
simply biased than will a younger student. Older students are more
discerning, given that they have had more time and education through
which to evaluate their own proficiency in the subject. In contrast,
younger students possess less self-awareness and thus are more likely
to be discouraged by a teacher's criticism or lack of encouragement. 293
Finally, the focus on choice, a focus so critical to the No Child
Left Behind Act, is especially strong in the context of primary and
secondary schools. Since students at primary and secondary schools
are much less likely to have a choice as to which school to attend, they
are limited to very few options regarding their education. Effectively,
parents of such children can attend a different school only by moving
290. Hutchison, supra note 9, at 1080.
291. PIPHER, supra note 181, at 11-13.
292. Id. at 12-13.
293. See id. (arguing that adolescent girls "know that something is very wrong, but they tend
to look for the source within themselves or their families rather than in broader cultural
problems. I want to help them see their lives in the context of larger cultural forces."). While Dr.
Pipher is referring in this passage largely to the broader problems of girls, it seems to logically fit
with an idea that girls tend to be more likely to try to figure out what is wrong with them if the
teacher does not seem to think they are smart or value what they say rather than appreciating
that it may be the teacher's preconceived beliefs that are guiding his or her statements.
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to another district. Therefore, it is even more important that the
public school system attempt to offer choices to its students within the
system. What appears to be a tougher constitutional task for primary
and secondary schools to overcome-the reality that they are
effectively forcing students who live in their district to accept the
education offered-also strengthens the case for adding a single-sex
education option to the curriculum. 294
4. The Overall Impact of the Change in Context
The distinctions between primary and secondary schools and
colleges and universities affect the constitutional validity of a single-
sex program in each setting differently. Some differences seemingly
make single-sex programs more easily justified in primary or
secondary schools, while other differences, such as the inability to
choose another school if you do not like single-sex education suggest
that a single-sex program is less constitutionally troublesome in a
college or university. Focusing on single-sex programs for younger age
groups, however, should ultimately make it easier for a public school
district to stay within the limits of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Still, the lack of educational choice
faced by children in primary and secondary schools makes it even
more important to ensure that none of the negative effects that
allegedly follow from single-sex education actually occur. This can
simply be seen as a warning to districts to be careful in their
construction of single-sex programs. To the extent that single-sex
classes are offered as an option, the overall choice parents have
increases, even thought they lose the option of being at a school that
has single-sex education at all, an option available to postsecondary
students. The other differences between primary and secondary
schools and colleges and universities-the increased similarity of
primary and secondary curricula across schools and the fact that
primary and secondary schools educate boys and girls at an age where
their learning differences are more pronounced-affect whether it is
possible or plausible to meet the intermediate scrutiny standard at all.
The school district that offers single-sex programs at a younger
age is more clearly serving each of the important government interests
that support the classification based on sex, and can more easily
construct equal, parallel institutions. Therefore, the district that
carefully creates effective programs and comparable institutions
294. See infra Part V.E (noting that offering single-sex education programs can only increase
choice if the students have the choice of staying with a coeducational program).
[Vol. 57:2:629
20041 SINGLE-SEX CLASSES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 681
should be seen as complying with the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although institutions of higher learning do have an
advantage in that students have other options, those sorts of options
were not sufficient to save VMI or MUW. Thus, a state is better able
to justify single-sex programs for younger students.
D. Providing Single-Sex Opportunities to Both Sexes
Another important consideration for schools and districts
desiring to institute single-sex programs is whether such programs
must be provided to both sexes if they are provided for one. If single-
sex classes are specifically instituted to remedy past discrimination, in
a given area where discrimination is shown, a school could offer
single-sex classes only to the sex which faced the discrimination. In
contrast, when single-sex classes serve other objectives, a district will
have difficulty justifying its action without providing single-sex
programs for both sexes, as most other government objectives, if
pursued honestly, would support the same approach for both sexes.
1. Remedial Objectives
States can constitutionally differentiate based on gender to
benefit members of a sex that has traditionally been discriminated
against in a particular field. 295 Title IX requires recipients of federal
financial assistance to "take affirmative action to overcome the effects
of conditions which resulted in limited participation therein by
persons of a particular sex."296 Some commentators appear to believe
that remedial objectives are applicable only to all-female classes, as
women historically have been discriminated against in education. 297 If
a state presents evidence both of the extent to which girls have faced
discrimination in classrooms and of girls' need to be assisted to
achieve in the fields studied in those classrooms, a state could meet
the remedial exception currently included in Title IX and recognized
295. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (holding that a State can
evoke a compensatory justification for an otherwise discriminatory justification, but only if it
benefits the gender that has suffered a disadvantage related to the classification).
296. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3 (2003).
297. See, e.g., Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
35, 41-42 (1997). There are certainly areas in which females are traditionally considered to be
superior, such as English and other humanities. However, the most common concern among
researchers has been for the treatment of girls in the classroom, and it is their math performance
that has fallen most behind. See supra Part IV.A; see also SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 171
(citing Judith Shapiro, president of Barnard College, as arguing that "[iun a society that favors
men over women, men's institutions operate to preserve privilege, women's institutions challenge
privilege and attempt to expand access to the good things of life").
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in MUW. Under some circumstances, evidence would exist to support
at least some single-sex classes for girls on a remedial basis, even
absent such classes for boys.298
Providing single-sex classes only for boys seems more
problematic. Attempting to persuade a court that a school's
motivation in constructing single-sex classrooms was to make up for
the discrimination boys have felt seems less likely to be successful. 299
It is not totally unsupported, however, as some commentators have
argued that our society does not favor boys and certainly does not
favor those underprivileged boys who are barely literate. 300 It may,
therefore, be possible to use remedial arguments to justify some
narrow range of all-male classes, even if comparable, all-female
classes are not created. However, consensus among social scientists
and other commentators as to the existence of discrimination against
boys is weaker than is consensus that girls face discrimination. 30 1
Thus, remedial grounds will most likely not be suitable as a basis for
widespread creation of all-male classes alone.
In MUW, the State tried to argue that MUW served a state
interest in assisting women who, unlike men, had been the victims of
discrimination.30 2 However, this argument was unpersuasive to a
Court that saw the State assisting women to enter a field that was
traditionally considered appropriate only for women.30 3 Thus, the
Court appears amenable to remedial arguments only where a state
assists boys or girls in entering a field traditionally reserved for the
opposite sex. 30 4 In the context of primary and secondary schools, such
fields as Math and Science are generally perceived as those where
boys excel, while English is perceived as a subject in which girls excel.
Therefore, the interest in remedying past discrimination is most likely
going to be effective in justifying all-girls classes in subjects such as
Math and Science and all-boys classes in subjects such as English.
298. However, if the classes are in an area where females have not traditionally faced
discrimination, the general history of discrimination may not be sufficient. See Miss. Univ. for
Women, 458 U.S. at 729 & n. 14.
299. But see supra Part IV.A.2.
300. SOMMERS, supra note 202, at 172.
301. Id. at 178 (arguing that "boys are still not on the agenda" of either the government or
the educational establishment). But see Levit, supra note 193, at 521 (noting that boys fall
behind girls in many ways in school). Levit concludes that for boys, the research generally
concludes that single-sex education gives boys a less favorable social experience, creates a
"hypermasculine ethos," and has no compensatory academic advantages. Id.
302. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 727.
303. Id. at 729-30.
304. See id.
682 [Vol. 57:2:629
2004] SINGLE-SEX CLASSES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
2. Outside the Realm of Remedial Action
Regardless of whether there is a remedial objective and
whether the gender being provided a single-sex opportunity is male or
female, not all commentators agree that single-sex opportunities for
both sexes are constitutionally necessary. 3 5 Professor Rosemary
Salomone argues that the Court's core concern in Virginia was the
allocation of equal resources to each sex and the avoidance of
promotion of stereotypical notions of group capabilities that might
limit life opportunities. 30 6 Therefore, she believes a state should only
have to prove, if it has an all-girls school, that it offers equal
opportunities to boys in a coeducational school with the same
admissions criteria and "substantially equal" educational offerings
and facilities.30 7 It should likewise be acceptable to offer single-sex
classes in a coeducational school as long as the classes for each sex use
the same admissions criteria and "substantially equal" choices and
facilities. 308
However, as discussed supra Part V.A, the majority of the
Court has expressed interest in the presence and quality of
comparable institutions. In Garrett v. Board of Education, one lower
court rejected a school district's attempt to institute a single-sex
program for boys only. 309 The State in Garrett aimed to improve the
education of boys in a failing school-an important state interest. The
court was troubled, however, by the fact that the educational system
was failing both sexes, yet the district attempted a solution only for
boys.310 The court took the school board's approach to indicate that its
members believed girls were the problem with the school system. The
court refused to accept that the means chosen, which effectively
focused only on addressing the problems facing boys, could be
substantially related to the government interest of improving
education for boys. With a similar opportunity for girls, the court may
have been more persuaded of the connection between the means
chosen and the objective of improving education. 31' Instead, the
305. See, e.g., Rosemary Salomone, Single-Sex Schools, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 2002, at A25.
306. Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541-42 (1996)).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See generally 775 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
310. Id. at 1008.




court's decision led the district to abandon its plan to pursue this sort
of innovative approach to improving inner-city education. 312
In general, many of the motivations for single-sex schools, like
the improvement of education seen in Garrett, apply equally to boys
and girls. Thus, when these motivations drive the creation of single-
sex classes, the classes need to be available to both sexes, as acting
sincerely on these motivations would require opportunities to be made
available for both sexes. In a case like Virginia, where a remedial
purpose does not exist, a court may not be persuaded that the state
with single-sex programs for only one sex has proposed interests that
meet the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. A court might
be persuaded, however, if the "diversity" rationale is applied to
creating programs for both sexes. 313 To succeed in creating a special
program for only one sex, a school would need to prove either a specific
remedial purpose or some other purpose that applies only to one sex.
Schools wishing to institute single-sex classes, then, should
establish such classes for both sexes to avoid battles over whether
remediation is actually the goal of any given program and, even if it is
the goal of the program, whether remediation is truly necessary. Such
questions would seemingly be too factually dependent to be easily
disposed of by summary judgment and would thus cost districts money
many districts can ill afford to lose.314
E. Offering Choice of Whether To Enroll in Single-Sex Classes
Mandating single-sex classes as opposed to providing an option
for such classes presents additional problems for a school district, and
would be barred under the proposed Title IX regulations. 315 The first
problem posed by a requirement is that the district risks forcing all
girls or all boys into a classroom that is run in a way that relies on
gender stereotypes and is, therefore, less effective for those children
who do not fit the stereotype. If, for example, a coeducational class
would better serve a particular child, forcing that child into a single-
sex class undermines the goal of improving education. The second
risk is that "separate but equal" will become less equal if each sex is
banned from pursuing any other type of education. Before Brown,
segregated school districts lacked any incentive to ensure the quality
312. See Gardenswartz, supra note 221, at 611.
313. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996).
314. Cf. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that state officials will
not risk high-cost litigation by instituting single-sex programs after Virginia.
315. Proposed Regulations, supra note 50, at 11279 (noting that the proposed amendment
would require that student participation in single-sex classes be on a voluntary basis).
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of schools for black students because those students were forced to
stay in the segregated schools whether they were good or not.316
Similarly, classes for girls (the general area of concern) are more likely
to fall behind boys' classes if the girls have no option of leaving them
for better classes. Competition between classes, therefore, serves to
ensure equality. Additionally, mandatory, single-sex classes
undermine one of the strongest arguments for single-sex education
advocates-that parents should be able to elect what is best for their
children. This is further supported by the connection of single-sex
educational opportunities to the No Child Left Behind Act. President
Bush supported the Act, in large part, to offer greater options for
parents in providing education to their children. 317  While, to
proponents of single-sex classes, requiring single-sex classes may seem
preferable to required coeducational classes, required classes,
regardless of their type, do not give parents more choices.
1. The Generalization Problem
Perhaps the most worrisome risk of single-sex education is that
the cries of "girls learn differently" will disguise an underlying
assumption that "girls learn less."31 8  All-girl schools often teach
differently, based on the belief that girls learn differently than boys.319
For example, all-girls schools may educate based on research finding
that girls need to be encouraged that they are doing well and that girls
316. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 741 n.9 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (noting that racially segregated facilities were the sole option for blacks, not an
additional one).
317. See GEORGE W. BUSH, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND 1-6 (2001), http://www.ed.gov/nclb/
overview/intro/presidentplan/proposal.pdf.
318. See Cerven, supra note 194, at 703 (citing Leora Tanenbaum, "Safe Space" Not the
Greatest Idea in Education, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Sept. 5, 1999, at 5) (noting the
argument that single-sex environments may encourage the belief that women cannot think like
men and that they are too weak to handle confrontation or intellectual challenge).
319. See, e.g., Ransome & Moulton, supra note 198, at 598. The authors cite several teaching
methods that are adapted to the needs of girls at all-girls schools:
They counter mass-media influences on female students by giving girls strengthening
havens where they can effectively navigate the troubling image of girls in today's
media with balance and self-assurance.... They incorporate research indicating that
team problem-solving works well for girls by providing extensive opportunities for
collaborative learning .... They sustain a predominantly female culture whose
hallmarks are caring, challenge, collaboration, competition, connection in the interest
of developing each girl to her fullest potential and to develop a moral context that will
serve them all their lives. In so doing, girls' schools honor women's voices, their female
perspective, their female way of doing things.
Id. at 598-99.
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benefit from group work.320 This risks both creating a belief that girls
cannot learn without a "special system" and undermining
opportunities for those girls who learn better in a more competitive
environment. 321 Allowing more cooperative activities may result in
girls who would have had low self-esteem or little confidence in, for
example, their math and science abilities, feeling better about
themselves and thus having more confidence. Those girls who would
have thrived in a competitive atmosphere, however, may end up
feeling patronized and coddled, and may never achieve as much as
they would have had they been challenged in a more combative or
confrontational way by their teachers. 322 This is not, of course, to say
that either way of education is better. Rather, the key point is that
each way is better for some individuals. Unfortunately, the debate
sometimes becomes, at least implicitly, "all girls learn better in
cooperative environments" and "all boys learn better with
competition." However, different people learn differently. There is
evidence that shows that, whether as a product of society or genetics,
girls tend to learn better in certain ways, and boys tend to learn better
in different ways. 323  However, these tendencies have clear and
numerous exceptions, and the courts have indicated an unwillingness
to let stereotypes of tendencies limit the opportunities of either sex.324
For this reason, requiring single-sex classes should invite
increased concern. To the extent that a school's justification for a
single-sex environment is that "boys and girls just learn differently,"
the reasonable conclusion is that the school is teaching the boys'
classes differently than the girls' classes. This may work well on the
average, especially if teaching methods are flexible as to both
particular students in the class and changes over time. But, creating
a system that convinces girls that they learn in a certain way and that
320. See Nat'l Ass'n for Single Sex Pub. Educ., What are some differences in how girls and
boys LEARN?, http://www.singlesexschools.org/differences.html (last visited June 10, 2004).
321. While, of course, there is no theoretical justification for defining the way coeducational
classes are currently run as the norm, and defining all-girls schools or classes as being "special,"
it seems unavoidable that if there is a new, different system of educating given to the girls, that
will be perceived as the "special" system.
322. This is similar to the experience of girls who had the "will and capacity" to desire the
"training and attendant opportunities that VMI uniquely affords." Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
While "most" women may not have chosen VMI, that does not answer the concerns for those
women who would have. Id.
323. NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12 (noting that some differences exist between "all boys"
and "all girls", but that they are much smaller than the differences between girls as a whole or
boys as a whole).
324. Virginia, 515 U.S. at 541-42 (stating that courts should take a "hard look" at
generalization or "tendencies" of the type that Virginia proposed to justify limiting the
opportunities of women).
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they need to have a certain type of education risks taking a large step
backward to a point where girls believe that they have to be a certain
way. This is exactly what concerned the Court in Virginia. The
majority feared that overbroad generalizations could "create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women," who
are limited by those generalizations.3 25 Allowing girls and boys to be
separated-but not mandating that they be separated-allows
teachers to tailor their instruction toward the majority's learning
style, without requiring all students to learn in those ways. Overall,
the chances that an individual student will be able to learn in the
ways that she or he learns best are increased.
2. The Inequality Problem
A second problem with requiring single-sex classes is the
increased risk that classes for one sex will be inferior, either in
resources or opportunities for academic achievement. With the "long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" in this country, the
concern is generally that females will suffer.326 NOW argues that the
experience in athletics, where women's coaches still make far less
than men's coaches, illustrates that separation by sex will never be
good for women.327 The Court in Brown v. Board of Education
declared that segregation of children by race deprived the children in
the minority group of equal educational opportunities. 328 It is not
implausible for opponents of single-sex education to fear that girls,
who, like black students, have faced historical discrimination, would
ultimately get weaker schools than the boys.
Where single-sex classes are an option, and not a requirement,
however, the risk that educational opportunities for one sex will be
325. Id. at 534.
326. Id. at 531 (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973)); see also RIORDAN,
supra note 9, at xi (noting the argument of many opponents that all-girls schools were
historically inferior to all-boys schools, but arguing that, while all-boys schools have had superior
resources, they have also provided an inferior overall academic climate).
327. NOW COMMENTS, supra note 12. This argument, in the form NOW expresses it, is
weakened by its failure to take account of the differing revenues of men's and women's sports.
328. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). One of the key reasons people worried
that all-black schools in a segregated school system would likely never be truly equal was that
white officials controlled the money and the black students were banned from the white schools.
Richard W. Riley et al., Education Reforms and Students at Risk: A Review of the Current State
of the Art ch. 1: Separate and Unequal (Robert Rossi & Alesia Montgomery eds., 1994),
http://www.ed.gov/pubs/EdReformStudies/EdReforms/chaplb.html. Without any options, the
black students had nowhere to go if they were unhappy with the education they received. Id.
Therefore, no check existed on the ability of officials to create schools that were not only
separate, but unequal. Id.
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superior to those available to the other is largely checked by the
existence of a coeducational option for girls who become dissatisfied
with the single-sex classes. If the girls' classes are consistently
inferior to the boys', or even just less well-thought of, at least some
girls will stop taking them and take the coeducational option. For the
girl who challenges the constitutionality of a school system where the
boys receive a much better education than do the girls, the fact that a
substantially higher percentage of the girls than the boys choose
coeducational classes would lend credence to the plaintiffs claim, and
help the court evaluate the nature of the school's offerings. If, on the
other hand, a similar percentage of boys and girls enrolled in the
coeducational classes, a court could more easily conclude that the
school's offerings were fairly equal. To the extent that the
coeducational classes are inferior to the all-male classes, this is
checked by the ability of the boys to elect to enroll in coeducational or
all-male classes. If a court questioning the constitutionality of a
school system finds that most of the girls have fled the single-sex
classes to enroll in the coeducational classes and most of the boys have
fled the coeducational classes to enroll in single-sex classes, then a
prima facie case has arguably been made that the opportunities for
boys and girls are not comparable.
This provides, both for the court and for the school district, an
analytically useful way of evaluating the equality of the educational
opportunities offered to boys and girls at the school. Thus, the court
should largely be able to avoid the struggle, recognized in Sweatt v.
Painter, of evaluating "those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness" in a school, such as the
"reputation of faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and
prestige."329 Additionally, the element of choice makes it hard for a
school to hide the fact that its classes are unequal. Most parents will
try to enroll their children where they will get the best education.
Only when the quality of education between single-sex and
coeducational classes is at least similar will the presence or absence of
the other sex generally influence parents' decisions.
3. The Lack of Choice Problem
Another, perhaps less troubling but nonetheless important,
problem with required single-sex classes is that a mandate
undermines one of the best arguments in favor of single-sex schools.
329. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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Congress enacted the No Child Left Behind Act to give parents and
school districts a choice as to what works best for their children.330 In
President Bush's push for improved education, he has said that he
wants parents whose children are in "persistently failing schools" to
have options.331 The amendment to the No Child Left Behind Act
allowing federal funding for single-sex programs was intended by its
sponsors not to mandate a new kind of education, but to allow
flexibility to school districts and parents to choose the best option for
their students.3 32
The desire for choice was a significant argument presented in
Virginia. The State argued that VMI served a State interest in
providing a diversity of educational opportunities. VMI offered
interested male students an opportunity to get an educational
experience that they could not get anywhere else. Although the
argument failed to justify the all-male school, the idea of an interest in
diversity of options and choice was not necessarily rejected. 333 The
Court was unwilling to accept that justification when VMI was the
only single-sex school which existed, as that undermined the sincerity
of the argument.33 4
However, when used correctly (i.e., not to provide options for
only one subset of the students, such as those males interested in the
military or females interested in nursing), diversity could be a valid
state interest. It would, therefore, help a state withstand intermediate
scrutiny of its provision of single-sex classes. If a school district forces
all of its students into single-sex classes, no substantial relationship
exists between the means applied and the objective of increasing
choice. The district has not added an opportunity in an attempt to
330. See Dep't of Educ., No Child Left Behind (listing President Bush's four reform principles
as more accountability for results, increased flexibility and control for local school boards, greater
options for parents, and a focus on providing teaching methods), http://www.nochildleft
behind.gov/next/overview/index.html (last visited May 10, 2004).
331. President George W. Bush, Radio Address (Jan. 4, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030104.html. Senator Hutchison has seconded this, arguing that
"[w]e must give parents and students the chance to escape bad schools that cannot guarantee a
decent education, personal safety, or the individualized environment each student needs."
Hutchison, supra note 9, at 1082.
332. 20 U.S.C.S. § 7215(a)(23) (2002). Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison said the amendment
was intended to make it easier for local governments or schools systems to provide single-sex
education ifparents requested such options. Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 1082.
333. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 n.7 (1996) (noting the argument of amici
curiae that diversity in educational opportunities is a legitimate state goal, that single-sex
schools can contribute to such diversity, and responding by saying that it "dotes] not question the
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities").
334. Id. at 535 (stating that 'Virginia has not shown that VMI was established, or has been
maintained, with a view to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the Commonwealth").
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help more students, but has replaced the current opportunity-
coeducational classes-with a different one-single-sex classes. If
students are given a choice, however, the state has supported a
justification for its differentiation between genders by providing an
additional educational opportunity.
VI. CONCLUSION
Single-sex classrooms may not be a perfect solution to the
problems with the education system in this country but, as Rosemary
Salomone has recognized, "this is not an ideal world, particularly for
urban minority students. 335 While single-sex advocates cannot prove,
at this point, that single-sex education is better for students, it is also
not clear that single-sex education is ineffective at improving
education for students. All that is clear is that the current public
education system fails many students and that wealthier parents have
a greater opportunity to enroll their children in a single-sex
environment (or any other environment not available in the public
school system) if they feel their child would be better served. At the
individual school level, students and parents report positive results
from their single-sex schools and question why the theoretical idea
that such schools are bad is allowed to override their real-life
experience.
Single-sex education is substantially related to the important
state interests of preventing discrimination in the classroom and of
increasing diversity of educational opportunities available to students.
Additionally, many researchers believe that, if the states are allowed
to experiment with single-sex classes, studies will definitively show
improved academic achievement, at least for some students.
Regardless of whether future studies will, in fact, yield this result,
experimentation will certainly improve our understanding of the way
that our children are best educated.
Particularly when single-sex classes are utilized instead of
single-sex schools, many of the constitutional worries are minimized
without decreasing either educational choice or the opportunity to
avoid discrimination. If schools offer comparable and voluntary
classes to both sexes, concerns about inequality are further minimized.
States have an important interest in ensuring that their education
systems best serve their citizens. Allowing some experimentation
335. Salomone, supra note 54, at 228.
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furthers the goal of uncovering the best solution to the problems that
plague the current system.
Ashley Elizabeth Johnson*
Thanks to the editors of the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW and to Professor Mark Brandon
for their helpful edits, and particularly to Rob Stone for extensive advice on structuring the
paper. I am also grateful to the faculty of the Vanderbilt Law School, for their assistance in the
note process and in all else that the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW does, and am grateful to my
family, for their encouragement throughout education and life. Most of all, thanks to Adam
Johnson, for analyzing single-sex education extensively with me and for inspiring this Note and
its development.

